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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Purpose of the study 
 
The heads of states and government representatives of the three economic groups in Africa, that is, 
the Community for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC) and 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC) (collectively hereinafter referred to as the 
Regional Economic Communities (RECs) have agreed in October 2008 to negotiate a tripartite free 
trade area (TFTA) which would later lead to a formation of a customs union.
1
 The TFTA is expected 
to cover twenty seven countries in the African continent and affect approximately a population of 
five hundred and ninety million.
2
 The combined Gross Domestic Product is estimated at US 624 
billion.
3
 This is a good initiative that could increase intra African trade and in turn improve the 
African economy.  
The initiative comes after many years of planning and coordinating the achievement of the ultimate 
goal of a unified African economic community.
4
 It is a response to the African Union’s objective of 
rationalising the existing regional economic communities to ultimately achieve a common market 
covering the African region. The efforts of the African Union resulted in the adoption of the Treaty 
                                                          
1
 Communique of the tripartite Summit of 22 October 2008. 
2Hartzenberg T ‘Introduction’ in From Cape to Cairo-Making the tripartite free trade area work (2011) i-iii 
available at http://www.tralac.org/2011/09/08/new-book-cape-to-cairo-making-the-tripartite-free-trade-area-work/   
(accessed 07 January 2013). 
3Africa Research Bulletin ‘Continental Developments’ http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-
6346.2011.03927.x/full ( accessed 18 September 2012). See also ‘Africa Free Trade Area talks enter stretch’ 
available at http://www.trademarksa.org/news/africa-free-trade-area-talks-enter-key-stretch  
4
Africa Research Bulletin ‘Continental Developments’ available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6346.2011.03927.x/full (accessed 18 September 2012). 
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Establishing the African Economic Community (Abuja Treaty). The Abuja treaty entered into force 
in 1994 and it provides a framework for the creation of an African Economic Community (AEC) 
over a period of thirty four years.
5
 The Abuja Treaty envisages using the existing regional economic 
communities as the building blocks of the AEC.
6
 The above position is captured in Article 88 (1) of 
the Abuja Treaty which provides for the establishment of the AEC through coordination, 
harmonisation and progressive integration of the activities of the regional economic communities.
7
 
Although the relationship between the AEC and the regional economic communities is not clearly 
defined, the creation of the TFTA is still a concerted effort to integrate the African continent and the 
TFTA will, if successfully established and operated make a significant contribution in the work of 
the African Union to ultimately form the AEC. 
The total GDP of the countries that are expected to be part of the TFTA is expected to reach one 
trillion dollars in 2013.
8
 A GDP of that standing has a potential of placing Africa on a pedestal when 
it comes to trade, business and the world economy. This would be a long awaited outcome as Africa 
has been an almost non significant player in the international trade and business arena, accounting 
for less than 2.5 percent of the world trade and  a mere 10 percent of intra Africa trade.
9
 Compared 
to other regions like the North America and the Western Europe, trade between African countries is 
minimal.
10
 Regional integration at this level has the potential of providing the much needed stimulus 
for attracting foreign direct investment from within and outside the envisaged TFTA. Pro-
                                                          
5
 Oppong R F ‘The African Union, African Economic Community and Africa’s Rtegional Economic Communities: 
Untangling a Complex Web’ available at http://www.eprints.lancs.ac.uk/30779/3/AJICL_PAPER-OPPONG.pdf 
(accessed 26 August 2013).      
6
 Oppong R F ‘The African Union, African Economic Community and Africa’s Rtegional Economic Communities: 
Untangling a Complex Web’ available at http://www.eprints.lancs.ac.uk/30779/3/AJICL_PAPER-OPPONG.pdf 
(accessed 26 August 2013).      
7
 Oppong R F ‘The African Union, African Economic Community and Africa’s Rtegional Economic Communities: 
Untangling a Complex Web’ available at http://www.eprints.lancs.ac.uk/30779/3/AJICL_PAPER-OPPONG.pdf 
(accessed 26 August 2013).      
8
Africa Research Bulletin ‘Continental Developments’ available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6346.2011.03927.x/full (accessed 18 September 2012). 
9
 Pearson M ‘Trade facilitation in the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area’ available at 
http://www.tralac.org/files/2011/09/S11WP112011-Tripartite-Trade-Facilitation-20110921-final.pdf  (accessed 14 
May 2013). 
10North America at about sixty percent and Western Europe at about forty percent, see Pearson M ‘Trade facilitation 
in the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area’ available at 
http://www.tralac.org/files/2011/09/S11WP112011-Tripartite-Trade-Facilitation-20110921-final.pdf  (accessed 14 
May 2013). 
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competitive effects of regional integration may lead to the reduction of production costs which may 
result in increased welfare of the society.
11
 The benefits of regional integration could be a reality for 
the African region but there is need for all the countries to realise them.  It has been argued that 
although some weaker countries might be reluctant in the negotiations of the grand free trade area 
for fear of being overwhelmed in the bigger free trade area, they may benefit in the long run.
12
 Some 
studies have moved a step ahead and attempted to calculate the benefits of entering into this free 
trade area.
13
 The study argues that South Africa and Mozambique may emerge the big winners in the 
anticipated free trade area whilst Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland may experience 
losses.
14
 
The African leaders, through the summit made a declaration that the tripartite free trade agreement 
would adopt a developmental approach based on three pillars of industrial development, 
infrastructure development and market integration.
15
 Industrial developmental is expected to address 
productive capacity constraints while infrastructure development would enhance connectivity 
between the various territories and reduce the costs of doing business. The general objectives of the 
TFTA are at Article three of the Draft Agreement establishing the TFTA. They include the creation 
of a single market with free movement of goods, services and business persons and the resolution of 
                                                          
11
Trade Law Centre (Tralac) ‘Africa rising through regional economic integration’ available at 
http://www.tralac.org/2013/04/05/africa-rising-through-regional-economic-integration/  (accessed 11 May 2013). 
12Africa Research Bulletin ‘Continental Developments’ available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-6346.2011.03927.x/full (accessed 18 September 2012). 
13Jensen G H and Sandrey R ‘The tripartite Free Trade Agreement: A computer analysis of the impacts’ available at 
http://www.tralac.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/N11WP062011_Tripartite_GTAP_20110323.pdf 
(accessed 11 May 2013). 
14Jensen G H and Sandrey R ‘The tripartite Free Trade Agreement: A computer analysis of the impacts’ available at 
http://www.tralac.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/12/files/2011/uploads/N11WP062011_Tripartite_GTAP_20110323.pdf 
(accessed 11 May 2013). 
15
E Gerhard ‘The Tripartite FTA: Requirements for Effective Dispute Resolution’ in Cape to Cairo- Making the 
tripartite free trade area work ch 3 available at http://www.tralac.org/2011/09/08/new-book-cape-to-cairo-making-
the-tripartite-free-trade-area-work/  (accessed 07 January 2013).  
16
Draft Agreement Establishing the COMESA, EAC and SADC Tripartite Free Trade Revised December 2010. 
17Trademark Southern Africa ‘COMESA,SADC, EAC free trade area talks set to conclude’ available at 
http://www.trademarksa.org/news/comesa-sadc-eac-free-trade-area-talks-set-conclude (accessed 11 May 2013). 
18
Annex1-Tripartite Negotiating Principles, Processes and Institutional Framework Guidelines for negotiating 
tripartite free trade areaamong the member/partner states of COMESA, EAC and SADC (2011) 2. 
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the issue of multiple membership as well as the expedition of regional and continental integration.
16
 
Article 3 (1) of the draft tripartite free trade agreement also captures the developmental approach 
adopted by summit as it states the promotion of rapid social and economic development of the region 
as one of the objectives. The negotiations of the TFTA are divided into two phases. The first phase 
covers trade in goods and the movement of business persons. These two aspects of trade will be 
negotiated on parallel tracks. The second phase of the negotiations will be dedicated to trade in 
services.  
The TFTA negotiations are at an early stage and already behind schedule by twelve months.
17
 The 
potential partner states have only agreed on the negotiating principles. Of importance to note from 
the negotiating principles is that the intention is to build on the work that has already been done in 
the three RECs but as to how it is not clear at this stage.
18
 The draft agreement, which includes 
fifteen annexes, has already been produced but it should be noted that the negotiations have just been 
launched and these documents do not have official status.
19
 
The creation of the tripartite has been generally enthusiastically welcomed by the African states 
involved, particularly the African leaders.
20
 One of the reasons why the negotiation of the TFTA is a 
celebrated effort is because it has the potential of resolving the problem of multiple membership that 
has to some extent adversely affected the implementation and progress within some of the RECs. 
The TFTA provides a framework for the development of a coherent agenda for regional trade in 
Africa. This framework could be an opportunity to provide a fresh start and learn from deficiencies 
of the existing RECs. Be that at is may, a lot of questions are still unanswered, and understandably 
so as the negotiations have just recently commenced.  
                                                          
19Hartzenberg T ‘Introduction’ in From Cape to Cairo-Making the tripartite free trade area work (2011) i-iii 
available at http://www.tralac.org/2011/09/08/new-book-cape-to-cairo-making-the-tripartite-free-trade-area-work/   
(accessed 07 January 2013). 
20African Economic Outlook ‘Developments in Regional Integration in Africa’ available at 
www.africaneconomicoutlook.org (accessed 17 September 2012). 
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One pertinent question that may require an answer at the early stage of designing the TFTA is how 
the envisaged TFTA is going to relate and interact with the existing RECs. The African regional 
integration has suffered a lot of negative opinions such as this one, ‘In Africa however the dilemma 
concerns weak institutions, poorly defined mandates and vaguely ascribed powers.’21  Could the 
TFTA be a start of another institutional hurdle? African regional integration has also been marred by 
questionable commitment of member states to regional integration. Regional integration has lagged 
behind in some quarters, for instance, a regional economic community such as SADC has had 
difficulty in fulfilling the so called deep integration. This integration is meant to go beyond the usual 
elimination of tariffs to cover competition policy, intellectual property rights, investment and 
services.
22
 It would be interesting to see if there will be any more commitment at the TFTA. 
1.2 Problem statement and research questions 
Regional trade agreements, especially the TFTA present an opportunity to expand trade and continue 
to develop the many developing countries through intra African trade. Regionalism is of great 
importance, especially now at a time when there is not much confidence in the multilateral trading 
system because of the impasse at the Doha round. It has been argued that one of the reasons why 
there has been an increase in regionalism is because of the very slow progress in multilateral 
negotiations.
23
 African countries are seeking new opportunities for growth outside the multilateral 
trade arena through the TFTA. An issue which deserves attention from the legal minds is the 
multiplication of institutions, particularly those dealing with dispute resolution.  
                                                          
21Hartzenberg T ‘Regional Integration in Africa’ (2011) 18 ERSD-2011-14 World Trade Organisation Staff 
Working Paper available at www.wto.org (accessed 17 September 2012). 
22
Kalenga P ‘Regional Integration in SADC: Retreating or forging ahead?’ available at 
http://www.tralac.org/files/2012/09/D12WP082012-Kalenga-Regional-integration-in-SADC-retreating-or-forging-
ahead-20120919.pdf  (accessed 9 May 2013). 
23
Antimiani A and Salvatici L ‘Regionalism versus Multilateralism: an Assessment of the European Union Trade 
Policy’ available at www.ecostat.unical.it (accessed 25 September 2012). 
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The three RECs are legal personas which can exercise some power in their regions and in so doing 
have established institutions that have a clear mandate in relation to disputes that may arise from the 
relevant agreements.
24
 SADC is an exception because it has dissolved its tribunal
25
 but it should be 
noted that there is a dispute settlement mechanism for resolution that may arise from the SADC 
Trade Protocol. 
The RECs have established their own dispute settlement institutions with rules and norms that guide 
the adjudication of disputes in their regions.
26
 The envisaged TFTA will have to possess effective 
power for it to achieve its goals. It will have to drive its agenda through its own institutions. Against 
this backdrop, a dispute settlement mechanism is proposed under Article 38 and Annex 13 of Draft 
TFTA Agreement. Once again, it should be noted that these are not final documents, a lot of input 
and work will have to go into them before finalisation. 
Presented with these possible layers of legal regimes and an unclear relationship between the two 
regimes, a problem of overlaps, conflicts and competition of jurisdiction may manifest itself. The 
jurisdiction being referred to is in the sense of choice of law and choice of forum. The two layers 
may just joyously go on their own in terms of individual peculiarities with highly unpredictable end 
results. This possible problem presents itself at a time when proliferation of regional trade 
agreements is under a microscope and legal scholars pointing out possible friction between World 
Trade Organisation law and regional trade laws, particularly with regards to dispute resolution. It is 
not clear at this stage how the TFTA is going to relate with the established institutions from the 
RECs.  
                                                          
24Erasmus G ‘The Tripartite FTA: Requirements for Effective Dispute Resolution’ in From Cape to Cairo-Making 
the tripartite free trade area work (2011) 83-108 108 available at http://www.tralac.org/2011/09/08/new-book-cape-
to-cairo-making-the-tripartite-free-trade-area-work/  (accessed 07 January 2013). 
25
About SADC available at http://www.sadc. int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun/  (accessed 11 January 2013). 
26Erasmus G ‘The Tripartite FTA: Requirements for Effective Dispute Resolution’ in From Cape to Cairo-Making 
the tripartite free trade area work (2011) 83-108 available at http://www.tralac.org/2011/09/08/new-book-cape-to-
cairo-making-the-tripartite-free-trade-area-work/  (accessed 07 January 2013).  
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In light of the abovementioned problem, several questions arise and need to be addressed 
accordingly. They are as follows:  
(a) What is the legal nature of these RECs and in particular their dispute settlement mechanisms?  
(b) What is the legal nature of the proposed TFTA and its dispute settlement mechanism?  
(c) What are the possible implications of having the two layers of trade dispute settlement legal 
regimes?  
(d) What is the experience from other regional agreements such as the North American Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA)?  
(e) What are the possible recommendations, drawing from the NAFTA experience as well as 
international law doctrines that could assist in the avoidance of possible conflict or overlap in the 
two trade law regimes? That is, the legal regime at the RECs level and the one at the TFTA level. 
1.3 Research hypothesis 
The assumption which is investigated in the research is that the creation of the TFTA will cause 
multiplication of institutions such as the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSM) and therefore create 
overlaps and conflict in jurisdiction within the African region. 
1.4 Objectives of the research 
The general objective of the study is to explore the possible nature of the legal relationship between 
the RECs and the TFTA with a focus on the interaction of the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) 
of the two regimes. One of the specific objectives of the research paper is to analyse the legal 
framework of COMESA, EAC and SADC with regards to their institutions that deal with DSM. 
Another objective is to investigate the legal framework of the TFTA with a focus on its proposed 
DSM.  The study further explores the possible jurisdictional overlap between the RECs and the 
TFTA as well as its implications and possible solutions. 
The study seeks to understand how the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), has approached 
this issue in relation to the interaction between its DSM and the WTO DSM. The last objective is to 
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formulate recommendations for the design of the TFTA’s DSM in order to achieve coherent trade 
legal systems that can foster regional integration. 
1.5 Significance of the study 
This study is of great significance in terms of timing or relevance and the issues that will be 
addressed. African countries are at a time where they could create an effective FTA that would 
ultimately improve the lives of the African population and even trigger the African programme on 
continental integration.
27
 It is submitted that all this is possible if done right. In order for the TFTA 
to get it right it will have to have a clear and effective DSM.  
That will not be the end of it for the TFTA; its dispute resolution will have to be coherent with that 
of the RECs for it to be practically effective because the legal regimes at the RECs level will 
compete one way or the other with that at the TFTA level. SADC had a DSM which has since been 
dissolved. This dissolution is a clear setback for SADC but could present an opportunity to re-look at 
it with the TFTA in mind. It is submitted that it is an opportune time to investigate the problem at 
this stage of the TFTA negotiations.  
1.6 Methodology 
The research will be desktop based. It will rely on books, articles and studies that have been carried 
out on the subject. There is a fair amount of literature on the overlap and conflict of jurisdiction in 
trade law in relation to the WTO and RTAs and international law in general. There is not much 
literature on the subject with regards to the relationships amongst FTAs. There will be an aspect of 
comparison as the NAFTA will be discussed and the study will attempt to sieve lessons that could be 
used in the design of the TFTA DSM.  
1.7 Limitations of the study 
The study will investigate the possible nature of the legal relationship between the TFTA and the 
RECs but it will be limited to institutions dealing with dispute resolution. The study could have 
included the other institutions but there would not be enough time or space to analyse all of them.   
                                                          
27Erasmus G and Hartzenberg T ‘Introduction’ in The tripartite free trade-towards a new African integration 
paradigm (2012) 1-8. 
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This study will be confined to the jurisdiction which will encompass choice of law and choice of 
forum. The comparative aspect will be limited to NAFTA’s DSM. The NAFTA has been selected as 
it has been said to be one of the best FTAs.
28
 
There is also a fair amount of material that reflects on the overlap and conflict of jurisdiction 
between NAFTA and the WTO and how the NAFTA has addressed the issues in its provisions 
dealing with dispute resolution. The other FTAs will not be used as there is not enough literature that 
demonstrates how they deal with the issue at hand. 
1.8 Structure of the study 
Chapter one will be a general introduction of the study. It will investigate regionalism in Africa, with 
an emphasis on the current trends. It will go further to investigate the origins of the TFTA and the 
motivation thereof. 
Chapter two will give an overview of the COMESA and EAC’s legal frameworks with a focus on 
their DSMs. This chapter will investigate how these DSMs operate. This chapter will further give a 
brief status of the SADC DSM. It will also provide an overview of the proposed DSM under the 
TFTA. The chapter will finally juxtapose the two and outline possible overlaps and conflicts of the 
two layers of DSMs. 
Chapter three will explore the overlap and conflict of DSMs in relation to choice of law and choice 
of forum. This chapter will unpack the two concepts and how they may play out in the region with 
the introduction of the TFTA DSM situation. This chapter will finally discuss the possible impact of 
this overlap and conflict on the trade agenda of Africa. 
Chapter four will bring in the comparative aspect by discussing the DSM under NAFTA as well as 
outlining lessons that could be learnt from NAFTA. Chapter four will also formulate 
recommendations for that could be of assistance in the design of the TFTA DSM and those that 
SADC could take heed of in the review of its DSM. The recommendations will be for the purpose of 
attaining coherence in the two layers of DSMs. 
                                                          
28
 Zi-yi M ‘A study on NAFTA: Establishing a better dispute resolution under CEPA’ (2008) 5 US-China Law 
Review 32. 
 
 
 
 
10 
 
 
CHAPTER TWO 
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT MECHANISM IN THE COMMON MARKET FOR EARTERN 
AND SOUTHERN AFRICA, EASTERN AFRICAN COMMUNITY, SOUTHERN AFRICAN 
DEVELOPMENT COMMUNITY AND THE PROPOSED TRIPARTITE FREE TRADE 
AREA: AN OVERVIEW 
2.1 Introduction 
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the East African Community 
(EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC) are intergovernmental regional 
economic communities designed for the purpose of creating free trade areas and customs unions.
29
 
The COMESA origins go as far back as the mid 1960s when the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Africa convened a meeting for the newly independent countries in the eastern and 
southern Africa.
30
 At that meeting which was held in Lusaka, Zambia it was recommended that an 
Economic Community of Eastern and Central Africa states be created. Subsequently in the late 
1970s a preferential trade area for the eastern and southern Africa was adopted.
31
 The preferential 
trade area/agreement had the ultimate objective of creating an economic community which was 
subsequently established and now known as COMESA.
32
  
 
                                                          
29E Gerhard and T Hartzenberg ‘The Tripartite Free Trade Area- Towards a New African Region Paradigm?’ 1  
30About COMESA ‘History of COMESA’ available at 
http://about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=95&Itemid=117 (accessed 07 January 
2013). 
31About COMESA ‘History of COMESA’ available at 
http://about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=95&Itemid=117 (accessed 07 January 
2013). 
32About COMESA ‘History of COMESA’ available at 
http://about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=95&Itemid=117 (accessed 07 January 
2013). 
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COMESA was established in November 1993.It has nineteen member states
33
 and covers both the 
eastern and southern part of Africa. COMESA was notified as a preferential agreement in 1994. One 
of COMESA’s objectives is to promote development in all fields of economic activity and the joint 
adoption of macro-economic policies within the COMESA community. This objective as stated in 
Article 3 (9) also includes the creation of closer relations among its member states. COMESA also 
undertakes to contribute towards the establishment progress and realisation of the objectives of the 
African Economic Community.
34
The assumption is that, by virtue of this objective, COMESA offers 
commitment or support for the wider African integration such as the TFTA in its founding 
document.  
Under Article 4 of the COMESA treaty, COMESA member states have made an undertaking to 
establish a customs union, abolish non tariff barriers to trade, establish a common external tariff, and 
cooperate in customs procedures and activities. Non tariff barriers remain a problem in COMESA 
and in Africa as a whole because of their contribution to the high cost of doing business which 
results in limited access to reasonably priced imports from the region.
35
 It can be drawn from the 
abovementioned objective and undertaking that trade liberalisation and integration are important 
agendas in the COMESA community. Although regional integration has had a lot of challenges in 
Africa, intra COMESA trade has had some celebratory moments. Trade within COMESA has been 
reported to have grown from US$3.2 billion in 2000 to US$17.4 billion in 2010.
36
 The COMESA 
member states undertake to adhere to certain principles that are enshrined in the founding treaty.
37
 
These include the principles of equality and interdependence of member states, solidarity and 
                                                          
33
Burundi, Comoros, Djibouti, D.R. Congo, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, 
Rwanda, Seychelles, Somalia, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
34
Treaty for the establishment of COMESA Article 3 (f) available at 
http://www.comesa.int/attachments/article/28/COMESA_Treaty.pdf  (accessed 07 January 2013). 
35Tralac ‘NTBs contributing to high cost of business-COMESA’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2013/04/12/ntbs-
contributing-to-high-cost-of-business-comesa/ (accessed 11 May 2013). 
36Tralac ‘Intra COMESA trade swells’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2013/03/19/intra-comesa-trade-swells/  
(accessed 11 May 2013). 
37
Treaty for the establishment of COMESA Article 6 available at 
http://www.comesa.int/attachments/article/28/COMESA_Treaty.pdf  (accessed 07 January 2013). 
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collective self reliance and commitment to peaceful settlement of disputes.
38
 Article 7 of the 
COMESA treaty establishes organs that support and facilitate its objectives. The highest policy 
making organ is the authority, which is composed by heads of states. Other COMESA organs also 
include among others the council, the court of justice, and the secretariat. 
The EAC is established under the EAC treaty which entered into force in July 2000. Its genesis goes 
as far back as 1977 when the Mediation Agreement for Division of Assets and Liabilities had a 
provision that permitted the three countries Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda to engage in further 
cooperation.
39
 It was on this basis that a tripartite intergovernmental organisation was formed and 
subsequently building on the work of the work of the Permanent Tripartite Commission for East 
African cooperation the three countries signed the treaty for the establishment of the East African 
Community, which later grew to a five member state organisation. The members of the EAC are the 
Republic of Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania, Rwanda and Burundi. The EAC established a customs union 
in 2004 which became operational in 2005. The EAC members signed a protocol for the 
establishment of the EAC common market in 2009. Article 5 (1) of the EAC treaty provides that the 
objective of the EAC is to:
40
  
‘...develop policies and programmes aimed at widening and deepening cooperation among the 
Partner States in political, economic, social and cultural fields, research and technology...for 
mutual benefits.’ 
The crucial element of the abovementioned objective is the desire to widen and deepen cooperation 
within the EAC community. In order for the EAC community to succeed in this wide and deeper 
cooperation, the member states undertook in Article 5 (2) of the EAC treaty to establish a customs 
union, a common market and subsequently a monetary union. Although the establishment of a 
                                                          
38
Other principles include; non aggression between member states, recognition, promotion and protection of 
fundamental human rights. 
39
EAC Overview available at http://www.eac.int/customs/index.php?option=com_content&id=123&Itemid=78 
(accessed 7 January 2013). 
40
Treaty for the establishment of EAC available at http://www.eac.int/www.eac.int/treaty  (accessed 7 January 
2013). 
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monetary union has been approved by the heads of states of the EAC, it has been criticised by some 
economic experts for various reasons.
41
 The experts argue that the monetary union might not be a 
success because the EAC partner states still depend on foreign aid to sustain their economies.
42
 
Another reason advanced by the experts is that there is imbalanced growth within the EAC partner 
states.
43
The undertaking at Article 5 (2) goes further to include the establishment of a political 
federation in the abovementioned article. Similar to the COMESA treaty, it can be drawn from the 
EAC treaty that trade liberalisation and integration are at the core of the organisation’s business. 
This theme runs through the objectives of the treaty and is buttressed by the fact that the EAC 
currently has an operational customs union and a signed protocol for the establishment of a common 
market. Trade liberalisation, especially through the elimination of non tariff barriers remains an 
important task as they continue to impede free movement of goods and services within the EAC.
44
 It 
has been reported that some members tend to regress and introduce new non tariff trade barriers 
                                                          
41Tralac ‘EAC Heads of State want Monetary Union by Nov.’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2013/04/30/eac-
heads-of-state-want-monetary-union-by-nov/  (accessed 14 May 2013). 
42Tralac ‘EAC Heads of State want Monetary Union by Nov.’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2013/04/30/eac-
heads-of-state-want-monetary-union-by-nov/  (accessed 14 May 2013). 
43Tralac ‘EAC Heads of State want Monetary Union by Nov.’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2013/04/30/eac-
heads-of-state-want-monetary-union-by-nov/  (accessed 14 May 2013). 
44Tralac ‘New Trade Barriers emerge in East Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2013/05/01/new-trade-
barriers-emerge-in-east-africa/ (accessed 14 May 2013). 
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instead of eliminating them.
45
 Despite some of this setbacks, intra EAC trade grew from $1.617.1 in 
2006 to $3,800.7 billion in 2010.
46
 
Article 9 of the EAC treaty establishes organs and institutions of the EAC. The EAC has a summit 
which is composed of the heads of states. Similar to COMESA, the summit is the highest policy 
making organ. The summit gives general directions to the development and achievement of the 
objectives of the EAC.
47
Other institutions are the council of ministers, the coordination committee, 
sectoral committees, the East African Legislative Assembly, the secretariat and the Eastern African 
Court of Justice, which is a judicial organ of the EAC. 
SADC was established in 1992 under Article 2 of the SADC treaty.
48
 SADC history goes as far back 
as 1980 when it was still the Southern African Development Coordination Conference which was 
focused on national political liberation and reduction of dependence of the then apartheid era South 
Africa.
49
 The Southern African Development Coordination Conference was later transformed to 
SADC, now with a focus on integration of economic development. Originally, the SADC member 
states were allocated the responsibility of coordinating various sectors. This was in response to 
national priorities that could be addressed through regional action.
50
 For instance Botswana was 
responsible for agricultural research, livestock production and animal disease control.
51
 This strategy 
of sector allocations to member states was later abandoned as the member states opted for a 
centralised approach which would then be coordinated at the SADC Secretariat headquarter in 
                                                          
45Tralac ‘New Trade Barriers emerge in East Africa’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2013/05/01/new-trade-
barriers-emerge-in-east-africa/ (accessed 14 May 2013). 
46Tralac ‘Intra COMESA trade swells’ available at http://www.tralac.org/2013/03/19/intra-comesa-trade-swells/ 
(accessed 11 May 2013). 
47
Article 11 (1), Treaty for the establishment of EAC available at http://www.eac.int/www.eac.int/treaty  (accessed 
07 January 2013). 
48‘Southern African Development Community: History and present status’ available at 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/sadc.htm (accessed 14 May 2013). 
49‘History and Treaty’ available at http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/  (accessed 12 
January 2013). 
50‘Southern African Development Community: History and present status’ available at 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/sadc.htm (accessed 14 May 2013). 
51‘Southern African Development Community: History and present status’ available at 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/sadc.htm (accessed 14 May 2013). 
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Gaborone, Botswana.
52
 SADC has fifteen member states and has over the years since the SADCC 
days grown from a GDP of US$ 20 billion to US$ 471.1 billion.
53
 As at 2012, SADC covered a 
population of 257.7 million.
54
  
Article 5 (1) of the SADC treaty provides one of the objectives of SADC which reads:
55
 
‘...to achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance the standard and 
quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa and support the socially disadvantaged through 
regional integration.’ 
Once again the primary focus is on regional integration. Regional integration in this instance is 
meant to drive the goal of achieving economic growth and development as well as collectively 
overcoming sharp disparities in the performance of the various economies. Regional integration 
                                                          
52‘Southern African Development Community: History and present status’ available at 
http://www.dfa.gov.za/foreign/Multilateral/africa/sadc.htm (accessed 14 May 2013). 
53‘History and Treaty’ available at http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/  (accessed 12 
January 2013). 
54‘History and Treaty’ available at http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/history-and-treaty/  (accessed 12 
January 2013). 
55
Treaty for the establishment of SADC available at  http://www.sadc.int/files/9113/5292/9434/SADC_Treaty.pdf  
(accessed 11 January 2013). 
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within SADC is based on the principles of balance, equity and mutual benefit as well as peaceful 
settlement of disputes.
56
 In order to achieve the abovementioned goals, member states are allowed to 
conclude Protocols focusing on various topics related to regional integration.
57
  Article 21 (3) of the 
SADC treaty establishes areas in which cooperation towards integration could be pursued.
58
For 
instance SADC signed a protocol on trade in 2005, which envisaged the establishment of a free trade 
area in the SADC region by the year 2008.
59
 Currently twelve of the fifteen member states
60
 are 
implementing the protocol. SADC has not yet been able to establish a customs union which was 
supposed to be established in 2010.
61
 Although some SADC member states were unable to complete 
                                                          
56
Article 4, Treaty for the establishment of SADC available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/9113/5292/9434/SADC_Treaty.pdf  (accessed 11 January 2013). 
57
Article 22, Treaty for the establishment of SADC available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/9113/5292/9434/SADC_Treaty.pdf  (accessed 11 January 2013). 
58
These are; (a) food, security land and agriculture; (b) infrastructure and services, (c) industry, trade, investment 
and finance; (d) human resources development, science and technology; (e)natural resources and environment; (f) 
social welfare, information and culture and (g) politics, diplomacy, international relations, peace and security. 
Article 21 (4) permits additional areas of cooperation. 
59Kalenga P ‘Regional integration in SADC: retreating or forging ahead?’ available at 
http://www.tralac.org/files/2012/09/D12WP082012-Kalenga-Regional-integration-in-SADC-retreating-or-forging-
ahead-20120919.pdf (accessed 9 May 2013). 
60
 Angola, Botswana, D.R. Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar,, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Seychelles, 
South Africa, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
61
SADC Integration Milestones available at http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/integration-milestones/ (accessed 12 
January 2013). 
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their tariff phase down, generally SADC has made some progress in liberalising trade as most of the 
member states have reduced and eliminated tariffs and quotas.
62
 
SADC member states have declared their commitment and support to regional integration and 
associate this act with the broader continental integration that has is under the auspices of the 
Organisation of the African Unity.
63
Article 9 of the SADC treaty establishes the SADC institutions. 
These include among others, the summit, the council of ministers, the tribunal and the secretariat. 
Similar to the COMESA and EAC, the summit is the supreme policy making institution.  
Regional integration seems to be the goal in COMESA, EAC and SADC. It could be argued that the 
three RECs have the same goals and aspirations, which is to have deeper integration that will 
ultimately grow the economy and improve the lives of Africans. The three regional economic 
communities (RECs) clearly have the same visions. There is considerable overlap between the 
substantive obligations contained in the RECs. In their quest to achieve regional integration and 
drive other important agendas, the member states of the RECs have embarked on negotiations of a 
grand tripartite free trade area (TFTA) intro. The TFTA is expected to integrate about 26 African 
countries. This integration would in turn increase intra African trade and drive economic growth and 
development.  One of the objectives of the TFTA as stated in Article 4 (1) of the draft TFTA 
agreement is to eliminate all tariffs and non tariff barriers to trade in goods. Generally, the RECs 
focus on among other things, the reduction and elimination of trade barriers
64
, by ensuring that 
member states implement trade agreements that have been entered into within the RECs.  The 
competing visions and goals are now expanded by the introduction of the TFTA. The TFTA will 
attempt to achieve what the RECs have always wanted to achieve but this time around on a bigger 
scale. 
                                                          
62Kalenga P ‘Regional integration in SADC: retreating or forging ahead?’ available at 
http://www.tralac.org/files/2012/09/D12WP082012-Kalenga-Regional-integration-in-SADC-retreating-or-forging-
ahead-20120919.pdf (accessed 9 May 2013). 
63‘A declaration by the heads of state or government of Southern African States’ available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/8613/5292/8378/Declaration__Treaty_of_SADC.pdf (accessed 14 May 2013). 
64Kalenga P ‘Making the Tripartite FTA work’ in Cape to Cairo-Making the tripartite free trade area work ch 1 
available at http://www.tralac.org/2011/09/08/new-book-cape-to-cairo-making-the-tripartite-free-trade-area-work/   
(accessed 07 January 2013). 
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Although the RECs seem to have the same goal, they are not on the same level in terms of 
integration as the EAC has been noted to be the most advanced as it is already implementing a 
customs union.
65
 COMESA has launched its customs union in June 2009
66
, but it is not yet 
operational while SADC is still negotiating a customs union.
67
 The TFTA will be at the level of a 
free trade area but with aspirations to later establish a single market with free movement of goods 
and services. 
The institutions of the RECs and the proposed TFTA institutions almost mirror each other. Generally 
the highest institution within the RECs and the TFTA is the summit or the heads of states. Other 
institutions such as council of ministers exist across the RECs and the TFTA but the one relevant to 
the discussion is the dispute settlement mechanism. The RECs have systems of judicial safeguards 
which should be consulted when the law of the REC is challenged. These judicial organs are 
important as they ensure certainty and predictability in the law of the relevant RECs. They also serve 
to prevent inconsistent interpretation of the relevant treaties. The certainty, predictability and 
uniformity of the laws of the RECs are expected to facilitate integration and ultimately lead to an 
environment that creates a stable economy. 
The COMESA court of Justice and the East African Court of Justice (EACJ) are the judicial organs 
of their respective organisations. They are the pillars of the systems of judicial safeguards in their 
respective RECs. SADC on the other hand had such a system until the SADC summit de facto 
suspended it at the 2010 SADC Summit.
68
 It should be noted that although the SADC Tribunal has 
                                                          
65Shayanowako P ‘Towards a COMESA, EAC and SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area’ available at 
http://www.panafricanglobaltradeconference.com/upload/towards_a_tripartite_free_trade_area_.pdf  (accessed 09 
January 2013). 
66Kalenga P ‘Making the Tripartite FTA work’ in Cape to Cairo- Making the tripartite free trade area work ch 1 
available at http://www.tralac.org/2011/09/08/new-book-cape-to-cairo-making-the-tripartite-free-trade-area-work/   
(accessed 07 January 2013). 
67
Kalenga P ‘Making the Tripartite FTA work’ in Cape to Cairo-Making the tripartite free trade area work ch 1 
available at http://www.tralac.org/2011/09/08/new-book-cape-to-cairo-making-the-tripartite-free-trade-area-work/   
(accessed 07 January 2013). 
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been suspended, there is a dispute settlement exclusively for trade issues under the SADC trade 
protocol. This shall be further discussed in section 2.5 of this chapter. Similarly there is a proposed 
dispute settlement mechanism in the TFTA. 
This chapter discusses the importance of an effective dispute settlement mechanism in the proposed 
TFTA. It expands to discuss the COMESA court; EACJ and the SADC Tribunal as it were as well as 
the SADC trade panel. It also gives an overview of the proposed TFTA dispute settlement 
mechanism. It will further outline possible overlaps of jurisdiction between the dispute settlement 
mechanism at the RECs level and the TFTA level. 
2.2 The need and importance of an effective Dispute Settlement Mechanism in the proposed 
Tripartite Free Trade Area 
It is indeed undisputable that an effective dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) is necessary and 
important in the implementation of the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA). It has been 
argued by the writer Gerhard Erasmus that
69
,   
“... the success of the Tripartite FTA will to a considerable degree depend on whether a rules-
based approach is followed, effective dispute settlement will be possible and remedies are 
available to the directly affected parties.’’ 
The above statement introduces three elements that are; rules- based approach, effective dispute 
settlement and availability of remedies. All these elements are equally important in the design of the 
TFTA but the focus is on the need and importance of an effective dispute settlement mechanism. 
The assumption is that the TFTA arrangement would first and foremost have to be rules based. It 
would be rules oriented in the sense that it will have to comply with World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) rules on notification of the said arrangement. This notification could be under the Article 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
68
About SADC available at http://www.sadc. int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun/  (accessed 11 January 2013). 
69E Gerhard ‘The Tripartite FTA:Requirements for Effective Dispute Resolution’ in Cape to Cairo-Making the 
tripartite free trade area work ch 3 available at http://www.tralac.org/2011/09/08/new-book-cape-to-cairo-making-
the-tripartite-free-trade-area-work/  (accessed 07 January 2013).  
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XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or the enabling clause, depending on how the 
TFTA will be notified. The WTO rules will govern both the internal and external shape or form of 
the TFTA. A rules based approach is desirable as it is predictable, provides a greater level of 
certainty and transparency. In order to preserve and secure a rules based arrangement, an effective 
dispute settlement mechanism is necessary. 
One may argue that it is enough for member states to get together, negotiate, sign off trade 
agreements and probably celebrate such signing off at some official ceremony. The writer argues 
that the above activities are not adequate for the fulfilment of the objectives of the trade agreements. 
Trade agreements are not an end in them, there is need for proper implementation to fulfil the 
interests of partner states and private parties. Differences that arise from the various rights and 
obligations in trade agreements are inevitable and must be resolved. Where such interests are 
jeopardised, or differences have arisen, there should be recourse or resolution and recourse can only 
be meaningful where there is an effective dispute settlement mechanism. This resolution or recourse 
generally involves adjudication by an independent judicial body with the power to interpret and 
apply a binding rule.
70
 The jurisdiction of such courts has to be respected by those who submit 
before them. A situation where jurisdiction of an adjudicatory body is not accepted by some member 
states could result in the collapse of such a body.
71
 
It has been argued that for one to achieve an effective dispute settlement mechanism, the founding 
documents or the legal basis for such DSM should be clear and unambiguous.
72
 If the rules and 
procedures that must be observed by the member states are clear and transparent, members with big 
economies would not be inclined to controlling the dispute settlement mechanism. The clarity and 
transparency can discourage a power based system. The kind of disputes that may be heard by the 
dispute settlement body should be spelt out clearly. It should be clear as to who can bring claims or 
be called to answer to such claims, how long the resolution of a dispute may take and what remedies 
                                                          
70
 E Gerhard ‘Governance, trade and statehood’ available at http://www.tralac.org/files/2013/04/S13WP042013-
Erasmus-Governance-trade-and-statehood-in-Africa-20130410final.pdf   (accessed 9 May 2013). 
71
 See section 2.5 of chapter two. 
72E Gerhard ‘The Tripartite FTA:Requirements for Effective Dispute Resolution’ in Cape to Cairo- Making the 
tripartite free trade area work ch 3 available at http://www.tralac.org/2011/09/08/new-book-cape-to-cairo-making-
the-tripartite-free-trade-area-work/  (accessed 7 January 2013).  
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are available. An effective dispute settlement mechanism will ensure that resolutions are made in a 
timely manner, therefore obligations enforced in a timely manner where there is non-compliance. It 
should be noted that a trade agreement such as the anticipated TFTA will serve millions of people 
who would want to make investment decisions, technological decisions and other decisions related 
to trade and investment hence predictability and stability of the TFTA DSM is necessary. It is 
important to carefully design a dispute settlement body that will serve the objectives of the TFTA. 
2.3 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa Court 
The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) Court was established under 
Article 7 (1) c of the COMESA treaty as one of the COMESA institutions in 1994
73
 as a supportive 
organ for regional integration. Its role is vital to the success of the Common market as it ensures 
predictability and certainty in the Common market rules.
74
 The COMESA court serves countries 
with different backgrounds of Common Law, Civil Law and Islamic Law across the Eastern and 
Southern Part of Africa.
75
Under Article 19 of the COMESA treaty, the court is charged with the 
responsibility of ensuring adherence of the law in the interpretation and application of the treaty. It 
serves to prevent inconsistent interpretations of the COMESA treaty by the member states. The 
COMESA court is composed of seven judges who are appointed by the Authority of the Common 
market.
76
 Security of tenure of the president and judges of the COMESA court is guaranteed.
77
 
In order to ensure that the mandate of the court is executed diligently, the judges are chosen from 
among persons of impartiality and independence.
78
 They are also required to fulfil conditions for the 
holding of high judicial office in their countries of domicile or who are jurists of recognised 
                                                          
73
About COMESA, COMESA Court of Justice available at 
 http://about.comesa.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=83:comesa-court-of-
justice&catid=43:institutions&Itemid=133 (accessed 07 January 2013). 
74 Kayihura D ‘Parallel Jurisdiction of courts and tribunals: the COMESA Court of Justice perspective’ (2010) 36 
Iss.3 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 583. 
75
 Kayihura D ‘Parallel Jurisdiction of courts and tribunals: the COMESA Court of Justice perspective’ (2010) 36 
Iss.3 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 583. 
76
Treaty for the establishment of COMESA Article 20 (1) available at 
http://www.comesa.int/attachments/article/28/COMESA_Treaty.pdf  (accessed 07 January 2013). 
77
 Treaty for the establishment of COMESA Article 21 (1) available at 
http://www.comesa.int/attachments/article/28/COMESA_Treaty.pdf  (accessed 07 January 2013). 
78
Treaty for the establishment of COMESA Article 20 (2) available at 
http://www.comesa.int/attachments/article/28/COMESA_Treaty.pdf  (accessed 07 January 2013). 
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competence.
79
 The COMESA court has jurisdiction to hear all trade disputes that arise from the 
treaty. It is accessible to member states, secretary general, legal and natural persons resident in the 
member states.
80
This jurisdiction shall be further discussed in section 2.7.1 of this chapter. The 
independence of the COMESA court is guaranteed through Article 9 (c) of the COMESA treaty 
which, provides that the Council of Ministers shall give directions to all other subordinate 
institutions except the COMESA court. This is a very important element as the court is enabled to 
exercise its function without interference from the Council of Ministers.  
2.4 The East African Court of Justice 
The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) was established under Article 9 of the EAC treaty in 
November 2001.
81
 The EACJ is conferred with jurisdiction over the interpretation and application of 
the EAC treaty. It addresses disputes that arise from the EAC treaty.
82
 The possible disputes may be 
those related to the trade agreements entered into between the EAC member states. The EACJ 
consists of a first instance court and an appellate court.
83
 The EAC judges are appointed by the 
summit. The court is headed by the president and vice president. The president acts as the 
administrative head of the court as well as of the appellate division, whilst the principal judge is 
charged with the work of the first instance court.
84
 The jurisdiction of the EACJ will be further 
discussed in section 2.7.1 of this chapter. The EACJ is accessible to the member states of the EAC, 
the secretary general of the EAC and the legal and natural persons resident in the member states of 
the EAC. The abovementioned parties can generally bring disputes to the EACJ over failure by 
member states or institution of the EAC to fulfil treaty obligations.
85
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 Treaty for the establishment of COMESA Article 20 (2) available at 
http://www.comesa.int/attachments/article/28/COMESA_Treaty.pdf  (accessed 07 January 2013). 
80Kayihura D ‘Parallel Jurisdiction of courts and tribunals: the COMESA Court of Justice perspective’ (2010) 36 
Iss.3 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 583. 
81Ruhangisa J ‘Parallel Jurisdiction of Courts: the EACJ Perspective’ (2010) 36 Iss.3 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 
575. 
82Ruhangisa J ‘Parallel Jurisdiction of Courts: the EACJ Perspective’ (2010) 36 Iss.3 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 
576. 
83
Treaty for the establishment of EAC Article 23 (3) available at http://www.eac.int/www.eac.int/treaty  (accessed 
07 January 2013). 
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Overview of the EACJ available at http://www.eacj.org/docs/Overview-of-the-EACJ.pdf (accessed 09 May 2013). 
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2.5 Southern African Development Community Tribunal 
The Southern African Development Community (SADC) Tribunal was established under Article 9 
of the SADC treaty as one of the SADC institutions but its jurisdictional powers, matters of standing 
and administrative issues are dealt with under a separate protocol.
86
Its role and purpose was to 
ensure adherence to and the proper interpretation of the provisions of the treaty.
87
 The SADC 
tribunal had jurisdiction over all disputes referred to it in accordance with the treaty.
88
 The SADC 
tribunal could address disputes brought by member states of SADC, natural or legal persons. The 
SADC tribunal has never heard inter- state cases and disputes concerning regional integration or 
trade.
89
 This is an interesting observation as this does not mean that regional integration has been 
seamless within SADC. 
A decision to suspend the SADC tribunal was made by the 2010 summit and subsequently a 
resolution was taken by the summit in August 2012 to commence negotiations on a new tribunal.  In 
that resolution, the new tribunal would be accessible to member states only, to the exclusion of legal 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
86
Treaty for the establishment of SADC, Article 16 available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/9113/5292/9434/SADC_Treaty.pdf  (accessed 11 January 2013).      
87Erasmus G ‘Another chapter in the SADC Tribunal saga: South African court confirms the Tribunal’s costs order’ 
available at http://www.tralac.org/files/2012/10/S12WP092012-Erasmus-AnotherChapter-TribunalCostsOrder-
20121003fin.pdf (accessed 7 May 2013). 
88
Protocol on the Tribunal in the SADC Article 15 available at 
http://www.sadc.int/files/1413/5292/8369/Protocol_on_the_Tribunal_and_Rules_thereof2000.pdf  (accessed 11 
January 2013). 
89
About SADC available at http://www.sadc. int/about-sadc/sadc-institutions/tribun/  (accessed 11 January 2013). 
See also, ‘Outcry over interstate SADC Tribunal’ available at 
http://www.saflii.org/za/journals/DEREBUS/2012/27.pdf  (accessed 8 February 2013) and  ‘Silencing a 
supranational court: The rise and fall of the SADC Tribunal’ available at http://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/25/silencing-
a-supranational-court-the-rise-and-fall-of-the-sadc-tribunal/  
90
Erasmus G ‘Another chapter in the SADC Tribunal saga: South African court confirms the Tribunal’s costs order’ 
available at http://www.tralac.org/files/2012/10/S12WP092012-Erasmus-AnotherChapter-TribunalCostsOrder-
20121003fin.pdf (accessed 7 May 2013). 
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and natural persons.
90
 The brief events that lead to the suspension of the SADC tribunal involve a 
case where the SADC tribunal found the Zimbabwean land policy to be in violation of the SADC 
treaty and subsequently Zimbabwe objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal citing that the protocol 
on the SADC tribunal was not binding on Zimbabwe since it had not been ratified in accordance 
with SADC treaty.
91
 
As mentioned in section 2.1 of this chapter, the SADC trade protocol provides a dispute settlement 
for mechanism for trade disputes that may arise from the trade protocol. Annex VI of the SADC 
trade protocol is largely based on the World Trade Organisation dispute settlement mechanism with 
a three step
92
 mechanism of resolving disputes. Article 1 of Annex VI of the SADC Protocol on 
Trade provides that: ‘the rules and procedures of Annex VI shall apply to the settlement of disputes 
between Member States concerning their rights and obligations under this Protocol.’93 
The dispute settlement under Article VI is accessible to member states only and its jurisdiction is 
confined to the rights and obligations under the said protocol. This means that where SADC member 
states have a trade dispute, the competent forum is under Annex VI of the trade protocol. The SADC 
tribunal could be in this instance an appellate body where the dispute is not resolved through trade 
panels.  
A panel under Annex VI is composed of three panelists
94
 and the panelists are chosen from a roster 
of panelists maintained by the Sector Coordinating Unit.
95
 The panellists are expected to have 
expertise or experience in international trade or international law.
96
 
                                                          
91E Gerhard ‘The Tripartite FTA: Requirements for Effective Dispute Resolution’ in Cape to Cairo- Making  the 
tripartite free trade area work ch 3 available at http://www.tralac.org/2011/09/08/new-book-cape-to-cairo-making-
the-tripartite-free-trade-area-work/  (accessed 07 January 2013). 
92
Consultations, good offices, mediation and conciliation and establishment of panels. 
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 Article 1, Annex VI concerning the settlement of disputes between the member states of the Southern African 
Development Community available at http://www.tralac.org/files/2011/11/SADC-Trade-protocol-Annex-VI.pdf 
(accessed 15 May 2013). 
94
Article 8 (1), Annex VI concerning the settlement of disputes between the member states of the Southern African 
Development Community available at http://www.tralac.org/files/2011/11/SADC-Trade-protocol-Annex-VI.pdf 
(accessed 15 May 2013). 
95
Article 6, Annex VI concerning the settlement of disputes between the member states of the Southern African 
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(accessed 15 May 2013). 
 
 
 
 
25 
 
 
2.6 Proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
It has already been mentioned in this chapter that the TFTA is under negotiations, therefore the 
TFTA dispute settlement mechanism that will be discussed is still work in progress. The tripartite 
task force has prepared a draft agreement establishing the TFTA as well as the annexes to the said 
agreement. These documents date back to 2010 and there has not been a revised draft since then.
97
 
The importance of dispute settlement cannot be overemphasised and as such, Article 38 of the TFTA 
agreement as well as annex 13 of the said agreement deal with disputes settlement. Article 38 of the 
TFTA agreement makes it the responsibility of the member states to make effort to agree on the 
interpretation and application of the TFTA agreement. It further states that member states shall make 
effort through consultations to arrive at a mutually satisfactory solution. The dispute settlement 
under Article 38 is cushioned in a best endeavour language and it creates opportunity for amicable 
settlement of disputes. Annex 13 of the draft TFTA agreement is mentioned as a last resort in cases 
where amicable settlement fails. Article 4 (1) of Annex 13 limits the scope of jurisdiction to member 
states of the TFTA. It only mentions member states as potential parties to a dispute under the TFTA. 
Unlike in the COMESA court or the EACJ, legal and natural persons resident in the TFTA member 
states cannot be parties to a dispute at the TFTA. It should also be noted that there is no mention of 
the applicable law in the TFTA dispute settlement mechanism. 
2.7 Jurisdiction of the dispute settlement mechanisms in the Regional Economic Communities 
and the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area  
It is undeniable that a dispute settlement organ is a standard institutional arrangement within the 
regional economic communities (RECs) and the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) as 
shown in sections 2.3 to 2.6 of this chapter. Member states have deemed it fit to adopt institutional 
configurations and proceedings for the purpose of resolving disputes. The DSMs are expected to 
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Article 7, Annex VI concerning the settlement of disputes between the member states of the Southern African 
Development Community available at http://www.tralac.org/files/2011/11/SADC-Trade-protocol-Annex-VI.pdf 
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introduce to the environment of international trade consequences for how trade relations will be 
adjudicated.  
2.7.1 Jurisdiction of the regional economic communities 
The jurisdiction in the dispute settlement mechanisms (DSMs) in the regional economic 
communities (RECs), particularly the two which are in existence, that is COMESA court and the 
EACJ have jurisdiction over disputes arising from their respective agreements. The provisions as to 
the scope of jurisdiction in treaties of the abovementioned RECs are identical. A member state or 
complainant who wishes to commence proceedings must allege that the other party has violated the 
relevant agreement/s. Although the SADC Tribunal is not functional at the moment SADC member 
states have recourse for disputes emanating from the SADC trade protocol at the trade panels 
established under Annex VI of the trade protocol. Its jurisdiction is limited to the rights and 
obligations under the SADC trade protocol. It should be noted that there is no provisions in the said 
treaties that the DSMs under the RECs shall have exclusive jurisdiction, which means that 
complainants can go to other fora for settlement of disputes that may arise from the treaties of the 
RECs.  
2.7.2 Jurisdiction of the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area 
Jurisdiction under the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area (TFTA) is not yet clearly defined. This 
lack of clarity is in relation to the applicable law. Article 3 of Annex 13 of the TFTA agreement 
provides that the TFTA DSM shall apply to member states in the implementation of the provisions 
of the agreement. Unlike the COMESA court or the EACJ which makes it clear that their DSMs 
shall apply in so far as the interpretation of the relevant agreements, the TFTA is silent. Article 19 of 
the COMESA treaty provides that the COMESA court shall ensure adherence of the community law 
in the interpretation and application of the treaty. Article 23 of the EAC treaty is substantially 
identical to Article 19 of the COMESA treaty. The two articles clarify that adherence to the relevant 
laws shall be in relation to the interpretation and application thereof.  
In simple terms, the judicial organs in COMESA and the EAC have to test the actions of member 
states against the law set in the treaty. Therefore the applicable law is the one in the treaties. The 
manner in which Article 3 of Annex 13 of the TFTA agreement is crafted does not provide for the 
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applicable law. It reads, ‘This Annex shall apply to Member States in the implementation of the 
provisions of the Agreement.’ It only clarifies a situation in which the TFTA DSM will be used. 
Similar to the EACJ and the COMESA court, there is no indication that the TFTA shall have 
exclusive jurisdiction. In fact in the TFTA, the parties’ recourse to the WTO DSM is expressly 
preserved by Article 3 (4) of Annex 13 where a dispute arises between a TFTA member state and a 
third country. 
This non-exclusive jurisdiction could stem from the fact that international tribunals and courts 
ordinarily operate under the principle of party consent;
98
 which simply means that which the parties 
to a dispute have asked the court to do. This is contrast with domestic law or courts which function 
in accordance with statutory authority or the constitution. It follows that if parties give an 
international court or tribunal explicit jurisdiction to settle their matter, the international adjudicating 
body that is seized with the matter often seems to be obliged to fulfil the parties’ mandate. This is the 
case even where the same proceedings could be commenced in another competent or parallel court. 
Therefore in the case of the RECs and the TFTA DSMs, the member states can go to either forum. 
2.7.3 Possible Jurisdictional Overlap 
As discussed in sections 2.2 and 2.3 of this chapter, the DSMs of both the RECs and the TFTA are 
established under different independent agreements. The RECs and the TFTA have legal 
personalities of their own and there is no hierarchy between the RECs and the TFTA. This lack of 
hierarchy trickles down to the DSMs. Hierarchy of courts is a concept that is usually associated with 
domestic courts. Under domestic law, there could be a magistrate court as the court of first instance, 
a high court and ultimately an appeals court.  The lack of hierarchy between the RECs and the TFTA 
DSM is not a bizarre scenario as traditionally the authority of international judiciary is limited to its 
own agreement or treaty.
99
 The authority of international tribunals or courts is specific and depends 
                                                          
98Pauwelyn J and Salles E. L ‘Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns and (Im) Possible 
Solutions’ 83 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1768742 (accessed 21 September 2012). 
99Pauwelyn J andSalles E. L ‘Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns and (Im) Possible 
Solutions’ 84 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1768742 (accessed 21 September 2012). 
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on the treaty it is enforcing.
100
 As a result, the RECs and TFTA DSMs are at par. There is no 
superiority amongst them and it could be said that they are parallel or have parallel jurisdiction. 
Jurisdictional overlap or parallel jurisdiction arises where the same dispute or aspects of it can be 
adjudicated before more than one adjudicating body. Jurisdictional overlap in international trade law 
is often discussed in relation to regional trade agreements (RTAs) and the WTO. It is said to usually 
manifest in a situation which has been coined double breach
101
, that is where a party to an RTA 
challenges a measure at the RTA DSM and then the same measure is challenged at the WTO dispute 
settlement body. This scenario involves a double breach of both the RTA and WTO obligations such 
that both DSMs have jurisdiction over the same dispute. This will further be discussed in chapter 
three and four when the comparative aspect is brought with a focus on NAFTA in relation to the 
WTO as well as other RTAs. 
Jurisdictional overlap is not a phenomenon in international trade law only; non trade organisations 
such as the Court of justice of the African Union
102
 and the International Court of Justice have 
potential jurisdictional overlap with the RECs. 
The existence of jurisdictional overlap has received some attention in African regional law 
discussions.
103
 The issue has been discussed from the perspective of regional courts vis a vis quasi 
                                                          
100
 Pauwelyn J and Salles E. L ‘Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns and (Im) Possible 
Solutions’ 84 available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1768742 (accessed 20 September 2012). 
101
 Marceau G and Wyatt J ‘Dispute Settlement Regimes Intermingled: Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO’ 
(2010) 1 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 69 available at http://jids.oxfordjournals.org/  (accessed 20 
September 2012). 
102
Most of the signatory states in the RECs are members of the WTO, therefore disputes from such member states 
may be referred to the RECs or the WTO. For the ICJ the same scenario may be applicable.            
103Ruhangisa J ‘Parallel Jurisdiction of Courts: the EACJ Perspective’ (2010) 36 Iss.3 Commonwealth Law Bulletin 
575. 
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judicial bodies within the regional economic communities, national courts and other regional 
courts.
104
 It has been argued that parallel jurisdiction exists between the COMESA court and courts 
of other regional economic communities because of multiple membership.
105
The other regional 
economic communities (SADC and EAC) have similar jurisdiction, the objectives of integration are 
identical that of COMESA and the regional integration plan is similar. The above argument has also 
been advanced from the EACJ perspective.
106
 Although there seem to have never been a major 
conflict between the two legal systems, it is submitted that this is a looming disaster that could 
jeopardise the unity of international law through multiple, divergent interpretations, particularly in 
the African region.  
Now, with the introduction of the TFTA, which is expected to have about twenty six African 
countries membership an issue concomitant to the same may be that the TFTA DSM will be an 
additional DSM, parallel to the existing regional DSMs of the RECs. As a result, disputes that may 
arise from the RECs may be adjudicated at the TFTA DSM. This parallel jurisdiction is likely to 
stem from the fact that these will be separate legal systems with identical substantive obligations. It 
is not provided anywhere that the TFTA necessarily means the cessation of the RECs. The member 
states will still have to obligations in both the RECs and the TFTA. For instance, a COMESA 
member state is obliged to abstain from any measures likely to jeopardise the attainment of the 
objectives of the COMESA common market or the implementation of the treaty.
107
 The EAC has a 
similar provision.
108
 The TFTA draft agreement establishes a free trade area in which members will 
be expected to take measures which will not hamper the implementation of the free trade area. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
107
Treaty for the establishment of COMESA Article 5 (1) C available at 
http://www.comesa.int/attachments/article/28/COMESA_Treaty.pdf  (accessed 07 January 2013). 
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The substantive obligations may collide where a member state takes a trade measure that is against 
the spirit of both the REC and the TFTA as it would stifle implementation of both treaties. For 
instance, Article 49 of the COMESA treaty and Article 10 of the TFTA draft agreement oblige 
member states to eliminate non- tariff barriers. This is a substantive obligation that seeks to support 
trade liberalisation. In this case, if as member state of COMESA, who ultimately joins the TFTA, 
introduces a non-tariff barrier, both the REC DSM and the TFTA DSM will be competent courts to 
hear the matter. They will both have jurisdiction over the matter and that matter may be commenced 
against that state in two parallel courts under two separate legal systems. 
Jurisdictional overlap may also arise where a ‘legitimate’ measure from one system is challenged as 
an ‘offensive’ measure in another system. Trade law often offers an opportunity to member states to 
enforce it provisions and decisions through the use of countermeasures.
109
 These countermeasures 
introduce a new dimension to the issue of jurisdictional overlap and may result in conflicts within 
the various trade law regimes.
110
Article 34 (4) of the COMESA treaty provides that the court may 
prescribe sanctions as it shall consider necessary to be imposed against a party who defaults in 
implementing the decisions of the court. The sanctions are not specified and it follows that they may 
be in the form of countermeasures to be taken by the complaining party. This will be some form of 
retaliation made in response to a default in the implementation of the court order. The complaining 
party would be rightfully enforcing its right under the REC although that measure prima facie would 
be violating the REC obligations. The EAC does not have a similar provision; it only goes as far as 
insisting that the partner states should implement court judgements without delay. Unlike the 
COMESA treaty, Article 38 (3) does not go to an extent of mentioning how non-compliance with 
court orders shall be dealt with. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
109Marceau G and Wyatt J ‘Dispute Settlement Regimes Intermingled: Regional Trade Agreements and the WTO’ 
(2010) 1 Journal of International Dispute Settlement 73 available at http://jids.oxfordjournals.org/  (accessed 20 
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Be that as it may, a member state that would have been the offending member state at the REC level 
or system may still challenge that countermeasure at the TFTA DSM. Thus, the countermeasure 
from the REC system is challenged as a measure in breach of the TFTA system. This type of conflict 
could be illustrated by the Mexico- Tax measures on Soft Drinks and other beverages (DS 308) 
case
111
, where Mexico imposed a twenty percent tax on all soft drinks with high fructose corn syrup 
in retaliation to a United States of America (US) sugar import regime that Mexico considered as a 
breach to the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). This is a product that Mexico 
predominantly imported from US. In this Mexico US scenario, the countermeasure may have been 
permissible under NAFTA but on the face of it, it is a violation of the national treatment principle 
under the WTO. This case illustrates how a ‘legitimate’ measure in NAFTA was challenged as an 
‘offensive’ measure at the WTO which predicate from jurisdictional overlap between the two 
systems. 
2.8 Conclusion 
It is concluded that there is considerable overlap between the substantive obligations contained in the 
agreements establishing the RECs and the TFTA draft agreement. The RECs and the TFTA focus on 
regional integration and trade liberalisation. This is not a new phenomenon as this is usually the case 
with the RTAs and the WTO. It is further submitted that similar to the RTAs and The WTO, the 
RECs and the TFTA are separate legal systems which have created or will create their own dispute 
settlement mechanisms that are expected to resolve trade disputes that may arise in relation to the 
implementation of the relevant agreements. This could be said to be a step in the right direction but it 
comes along with its own complexities. One such complexity is jurisdictional overlap. Jurisdictional 
overlap is where the same dispute may be adjudicated in two or more courts. Jurisdictional overlap 
has been shown to exist between the RECs but that is not the focus of this paper, which has confined 
itself to jurisdictional overlap between the RECs and the TFTA. Jurisdictional overlap has been 
discussed from the viewpoint of double breach and the enforcement of rights and obligations in one 
                                                          
111
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system which turns out to be a violation in another system. Jurisdictional overlap is tied to the 
selection of law as well as of the forum that one would use for purposes of resolving disputes. The 
concept of choice of forum in relation to the proposed TFTA shall be discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER THREE  
 
CHOICE OF FORUM: ISSUES, CONCERNS AND POSSSIBLE RESOLUTIONS FOR THE 
PROPOSED TRIPARTITE FREE TRADE AREA 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter has extensively discussed the overlap of subject matter between the regional 
economic communities (RECs) and the anticipated tripartite free trade area (TFTA). This overlap of 
subject matter has been shown to be one of the reasons for overlap of jurisdiction between the RECs 
and the TFTA. Overlap of jurisdiction may create an environment where parties have to carefully 
think and select the law which they would wish to apply to their dispute. Tied to the selection of the 
law is the selection of the forum because the law which the parties seek will lead them to a particular 
forum. For instance, a Southern African Development Community (SADC) member state may prefer 
the World Trade Organisation (WTO) law over SADC law and in that case such as member state 
will have to take its dispute to the WTO instead of SADC. 
 
The above analogy demonstrates that parties may have the luxury of bringing one trade dispute to 
different fora. Thus, overlap of jurisdiction may create an opportunity for forum shopping between 
the RECs DSM and the TFTA DSM. This chapter will attempt to discuss how the issues of choice of 
forum and choice of law may play between the RECs and the TFTA. This discussion will focus on 
factors that may influence member states of the RECs and the TFTA in choosing the forum or the 
law to be applied in a dispute due to be heard in either of the DSMs. It will further discuss possible 
consequences of such choices on the regional law as well as the African trade agenda. It will 
conclude by discussing possible solutions based on domestic law principles such as res judicata, lis 
pendens and forum non coveniens as well as exclusive choice of forum which has been used in some 
regional trade agreements. 
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3.2 Choice of forum and choice of law in international tribunals 
  
As pointed out in the introduction of this chapter, overlap of jurisdiction has its consequences and 
one of these may be forum shopping. Forum shopping is whereby parties to a dispute bring their 
action in the forum that they consider will be most favourable to them. Forum shopping has also 
been defined as a litigant’s attempt to have his action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where 
he feels he will receive the most favourable judgement or verdict.
112
 The issue related to choice of 
forum is not only forum shopping, states may also decide to commence proceedings in more than 
one forum or re-litigate a dispute that has already been decided in another forum. 
3.3 The World Trade Organisation and Regional Trade Agreements 
The World Trade Organisation (WTO) approves the creation of regional trade agreements (RTAs) 
under its Article XXIV
113
 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Taking into 
account that the RTAs may design their own DSMs, they tend to offer much more than preferential 
treatment within the trade arrangement. They also offer an alternative to dispute settlement at the 
WTO.
114
 Conversely, the WTO has exclusive compulsory jurisdiction over disputes that arise under 
any of its agreements.
115
 This means that any trade related dispute could be brought to the WTO 
regardless of the fact that there might be regional forum that can hear the matter.  
This opportunity or risk to pick and choose gives rise to forum shopping because complainants can 
bring actions regionally, multilaterally or can choose not to bring an action at all.
116
 Parties have 
different reasons for making such choices and these shall be further discussed later in this chapter. 
The luxury of forum shopping has been shown between the WTO and RTAs. The Mexico- Tax 
measures on Soft Drinks and other beverages (DS 308) case
117
 (hereinafter referred to as the 
                                                          
112Black Law’s Dictionary. 
113WTO ‘The Legal Texts’Article XXIV, GATT 1994. 
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http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/mlb66/forum%20shopping%20io.pdf  (accessed  8 March 2013) 735. 
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Mexico-Tax measures on Soft drinks case) is one of those cases that illustrate that parties to RTAs 
may have a luxury of bringing the same dispute before the WTO and an RTA.  In the 
abovementioned case, Mexico in its pursuit to enforce its rights under the NAFTA had requested a 
panel at the NAFTA in relation to the sugar quota it was allocated at the NAFTA. The process of 
formation of a panel was stalled as the US refused to appoint panellists. Mexico then retaliated by 
imposing a discriminatory tax on US import soft drinks. The US then responded to this tax by 
bringing an action against Mexico at the WTO and received a ruling in its favour. The sugar quota 
issue remained to be resolved at the NAFTA. 
 
This case without delving into its finer details simply demonstrates that the US had a luxury of going 
to either the NAFTA DSM or the WTO DSM. The US carefully ‘shopped’ around and decided that 
the WTO would be the best forum for their dispute although they had the NAFTA DSM which could 
still entertain the matter. It is the writer’s opinion that maybe the US could foresee that it may not 
succeed at the NAFTA DSM because the tax issue may be tied to the sugar issue. 
 
The choice of law as mentioned in section 3.2 of this chapter is tied to the choice of forum. The  
Mexico- Tax measures on Soft Drinks case
118
 shows that the US was interested in the WTO law. The 
US realised that it has the substantive law advantage at the WTO, rather than NAFTA. It is not just 
about preferring to have the dispute in Geneva, but choosing the law that will lead to a forum which 
may give a favourable ruling. 
 
Another relevant case is the Canada- Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (DS31) case
119
. In 
this case the US was the complainant and the measures which were at issue were the Canadian 
prohibition of the importation into Canada of any periodical that was a special edition, the Canadian 
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http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds308sum_e.pdf  (accessed 30 January 2013). 
118
Mexico- Tax measures on Soft Drinks and other beverages (DS 308) available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds308sum_e.pdf  (accessed 30 January 2013). 
119
Canada- Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (DS31) available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/dispu_summary95_11_e.pdf (accessed 8 March 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
assessment of an eighty percent excise tax on split- run issue edition of a periodical and the postal 
rate scheme that under which applied differently between domestic and foreign periodicals. 
 
This case went all the way to the appellate body of the WTO and it was found that the prohibition of 
importation of periodicals by Canada was against Article XI of the GATT
120
 which prohibits 
quantitative restrictions. The Canadian first measure could also not be justified under Article XX 
(d)
121
 because it could not be regarded as a measure necessary to secure compliance with Canadian 
tax laws. Article XX (d) is an exception to the WTO rules and applies if a measure is necessary to 
secure compliance with laws. The appellate body further found that the second Canadian measure 
was inconsistent with Article III: 2 of the GATT.
122
 The third measure was found to be justified 
under Article III: 8 (b) of the GATT.
123
 
 
The US and Canada are both parties to the NAFTA; therefore the US could have brought it case to 
the NAFTA, but opted to go the WTO. It turns out once again the US was very careful in its choice 
of law.  The US realised that the WTO law could be to their advantage as the NAFTA permitted 
discrimination between foreign made and domestic made periodicals. That choice of law leads to the 
WTO forum. 
 
3.4 The Common Market for Eastern and Southern African Court, Eastern African Court of 
Justice and Southern African Development Community Tribunal 
 
Regionally there are not much reports, at least on record of forum shopping between the RECs. 
Desire Kayihura registrar of  Common Market for Eastern and Southern African Court (COMESA) 
court (2010)
124
 in her report mentioned that there has been instances of forum shopping between the 
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RECs whereby parties opted to file their matter at the COMESA court in Lusaka, Zambia, though 
they had an option to file the matter at the Eastern African Court of Justice (EACJ) in Arusha, 
Tanzania which was closer to their domicile being Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC). Uganda and the DRC are members of both COMESA and EAC. It should be noted that the 
focus of this paper is not on the interactions between the RECs but the RECs and the proposed 
tripartite free trade area (TFTA). It is therefore important to discuss and analyse how choice of 
forum may be approached between the TFTA and the RECs. 
 
3.5 The Regional Economic Communities and the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area 
  
It is the writer’s opinion that since there is no hierarchy between the RECs DSM and the proposed 
TFTA DSM, member states may have an option of bringing an action in either one the DSM or both 
the RECs DSM and the TFTA DSM. It would appear that the non-exclusive jurisdiction in the RECs 
DSMs as discussed in section 2.7.1 of chapter two suggest that forum shopping is a freedom that 
member states have chosen to retain. The issue related to choice of forum is not only forum 
shopping, states may also decide to commence proceedings in more than one forum or re-litigate a 
dispute that has already been decided in another forum. 
 
For instance, Zambia and Swaziland are members of COMESA and may ultimately join the TFTA. 
Both COMESA and the TFTA address trade issues such as quantitative restrictions. Now, if the two 
countries find themselves embroiled in a dispute over quantitative restrictions, the COMESA court 
or the TFTA DSM have jurisdiction to hear the matter. The two states have a luxury of forum 
shopping. Other forum shopping, Zambia may commence proceedings in the COMESA court whilst 
Swaziland goes to the TFTA DSM or the one of the parties may re litigate the dispute after it has 
been heard in either court. 
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3.6 Influential factors in choosing a forum 
 
Factors that parties may consider in choosing a forum at which their dispute may be heard are varied. 
As some have stated:
125
  
 
‘... States do not pursue multiple dispute settlement proceedings needlessly, working instead 
towards ensuring that their grievances are brought before the most equipped fora for settling their 
disputes.’ 
 
The questions are how do states determine the most equipped fora? What do they consider? What 
influences their decisions? It is argued that complainants strategically discriminate among different 
fora depending on the measure at issue.
126
 This argument is similar to the one that suggests that in 
making a choice of forum, such decision is made on a case by case basis.
127
The above arguments are 
related because a complainant will have different measures to consider for different cases, therefore 
the discrimination of various fora cannot be done wholesale. The influential factors may be legal, 
political and practical considerations. The legal requirements may be that under a particular treaty, 
depending on the subject matter at issue and the wording of the treaty the dispute may be brought to 
a particular forum. In that case, the subject matter or the wording of a treaty determines where the 
dispute should be heard. The institutional rules would pre determine where complainants may file 
their claims. 
                                                          
125
 Marceau G ‘Conflicts of  Norms and Conflicts of Jurisdictions: The relationship between the WTO Agreement 
and MEAs and other treaties’ (2001) 35(6) Journal of World Trade 1081 available at 
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accessed (8 March 2013). 
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International Organisation 2007 available  at 
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For instance, the wording of GATT 1994
128
 mandates WTO member states to seek recourse at the 
WTO DSM in the event that the complainant member alleges violation of benefits under the WTO 
covered agreements. It reads:
129
  
 
‘When members seek the redress of a violation or other nullification or impairment of benefits 
under the covered agreements or an impediment of to the attainment of any objective of the 
covered agreement, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this 
understanding.’ 
 
It has been argued that not only does Article 23 provide for compulsory jurisdiction but it also 
provides for exclusive jurisdiction such that violations of the covered agreements must be settled by 
the WTO DSM, exclusively.
130
 One could argue that if there is a legal requirement that a dispute 
should be compulsorily settled at a particular forum, then there are no qualms since that will be the 
only competent judicial body.  
Another controlling factor which may be considered by parties to a dispute in choosing a forum is 
the substantive law advantages. This means that a party to a dispute would choose a forum where it 
considers it would be advantageous in view of the applicable law. The complainant is interested in 
the treaty in which its claim would stand the best chance and for the defendant it is about the 
defences available under the respective treaties.  
This was demonstrated earlier at section 3.3 of this chapter in Mexico- Tax measures on Soft Drinks 
case
131
. This controlling factor is logical because ultimately the complainant wants a favourable 
decision which could be more or less liberal or free trade oriented than the prevailing circumstances 
created by the defendant.
132
 On the other hand the defendant would like to maintain the status quo. It 
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 WTO ‘The Legal Texts’Article 23 (1) of the DSU. 
129 WTO ‘The Legal Texts’Article 23 (1) of the DSU. 
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is the author’s opinion that what the US wanted in the abovementioned case was a more free trade 
oriented outcome which would ensure that the tax imposed by Mexico would be discontinued. 
The substantive law advantage maybe a controlling factor in the process of choosing a forum 
between the RECs DSM and the proposed TFTA DSM. Member states are likely to carefully assess 
and consider the forum at which they may have substantive law advantage. This assessment will 
have to be on a case by case basis. It cannot really be a general assessment because in one case the 
complainant maybe seeking a more liberal ruling and at other times the complainant may be seeking 
an otherwise ruling. The author is of the opinion that the only general assessment that may be 
undertook is in relation to jurisdiction. As noted in this paper at section 2.7.1 of chapter two, the 
RECs DSMs have jurisdiction to only examine claims under their respective treaties. On the other 
hand, the jurisdiction of the proposed TFTA DSM is not clearly defined and this may be attributed to 
the fact that it is still an agreement in the making. Be that as it may, the proposed TFTA DSM 
mentions that the TFTA DSM shall apply in the implementation of the provisions of the 
agreement.
133
 
 
The TFTA will be a free trade that is going to be built on the work that has already been done at the 
RECs
134
, and that the EAC has implemented a customs union,
135
 the COMESA is an FTA that is 
about to implement a customs union,
136
 and some SADC member states are implementing the SADC 
trade protocol.
137
 Considering the above facts, it is likely that the TFTA will have less strict rules 
compared to the RECs; therefore complainants may have an incentive to bring their cases to the 
TFTA instead of the RECs. This submission is made with a view that if indeed the TFTA will be 
                                                          
133
 Draft TFTA text Article 3 of Annex 13 
134
 Annex1-Tripartite Negotiating Principles, Processes and Institutional Framework Guidelines for negotiating 
tripartite free trade are among the member/partner states of COMESA, EAC and SADC  (2011) 2. 
135Shayanowako P ‘Towards a COMESA, EAC and SADC Tripartite Free Trade Area’ available at 
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136Kalenga P ‘Making the Tripartite FTA work’ in From Cape to Cairo ch 1 available at 
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built on work that has already been done, then the performance of all states in their various RECs 
will have to be taken into account and the average performance may be the basis of the TFTA. 
 
It has been suggested that a controlling factor in the choice of forum could be the complainant’s 
expectation with regard to the future value of the ruling or the precedent set.
138
  Precedent in this 
context means adding to the judicial body’s case law concerning the obligations at issue. In the 
discussion of choice of forum between the WTO and RTAs, it was argued that a complainant has an 
option of setting a precedent regionally or multilaterally. The purpose of the precedent would be to 
prevent the defendant’s protectionism and also facilitate future litigation. 
 
It is the author’s opinion that this view seems to be a weak motivation for choice of a particular 
forum. This submission stems from the view that when trade disputes arise, the main goal for the 
parties is to get a resolution and allow trade to continue on agreed terms. It is the author’s view that 
member states seek to change trade behaviours by agreements rather than court rulings and that a 
precedent can only be a bonus and not the primary factor of choosing a particular court. Although 
the author hereof is of the view that precedent maybe a weak motivation for choice of forum, the 
author acknowledges the importance of WTO precedents as non binding as they are and other 
precedents form other rules based systems. 
 
In a comparative analysis of the SADC DSM and the WTO DSM,
139
 eleven factors influencing 
choice of law were discussed. In addition to the ones already discussed in this section, the issue of 
standing was highlighted as one of the factors. The issue of who can initiate a complaint and against 
who plays a vital role when choosing a forum at which a dispute could be resolved. In the 
abovementioned analysis it was concluded that since private actors play an important role in trade, 
                                                          
138Busch  M L ‘Overlapping Institutions,Forum Shopping, and Dispute Settlement in International Trade’ 
International Organisation 2007 available  at 
http://www9.georgetown.edu/faculty/mlb66/forum%20shopping%20io.pdf  (accessed  8 March 2013) 736. 
139Pauwelyn J ‘ Going Global, Regional, or Both? Dispute Settlement in the Southern African Development (SADC) 
and Overlaps with the WTO and other istitutions’ (2004) Minnesota Journal of Global Trade available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=478041 (accessed 28 February 2013). Other factors are: cost 
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that is being the traders themselves, they would be inclined to choose a court where they have 
standing.  
 
It was concluded that the favourable court would be the SADC Tribunal as it were instead of the 
WTO DSM since legal and natural persons could initiate complaints at the SADC Tribunal.
140
 This 
conclusion appears to be logical because private individuals are the ones who actually trade and 
would be very active and influential in a trade dispute, therefore if there is an opportunity for them to 
initiate a complaint they would jump at the opportunity. As pointed out in section 2.6 of chapter two, 
only member states would be able to initiate and defend claims before the TFTA DSM. The 
COMESA court and the EACJ as was pointed out in sections 2.3 and 2.4 of chapter two are 
accessible to both member states and private actors. This feature in COMESA court and the EACJ 
may be an incentive for complainants to initiate disputes at the said RECs rather that the proposed 
TFTA DSM. 
 
3.7 Concerns associated with forum shopping 
 
As some have argued, multiple courts are better than no courts at all.
141
 This argument is from a 
view that complainants will have various fora at which they can file their claims. This could be an 
advantage to the complainants because a healthy competition between the courts could breed an 
opportunity for improved quality of rulings and expediency of proceedings.
142
 In this instance, forum 
shopping is not a real concern as it seems states would only be seeking a better service. It is not a 
real problem if parties choose a particular forum, stick with it and accept its ruling as was done in the 
Canada- Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (DS31) case.
143
 While multiple judicial fora may 
be considered an indication of willingness of states to submit themselves to the rule of law in their 
                                                          
140Pauwelyn J ‘ Going Global, Regional, or Both? Dispute Settlement in the Southern African Development (SADC) 
and Overlaps with the WTO and other institutions’ (2004) Minnesota Journal of Global Trade available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=478041 (accessed 28 February 2013). 
141Pauwelyn J and Salles E. L ‘Forum Shopping Before International Tribunals: (Real) Concerns and (Im) Possible 
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interactions with the international community, various concerns concomitant to the same may also 
be identified.  
 
Problems arise when there is re-litigation or multiple filings. This is whereby parties decide to take 
the luxury of forum shopping a step further and decide to engage in duplicative proceedings or 
simply re-litigate in a different forum because they consider a ruling they received unsatisfactory. 
The latter scenario is demonstrated by the Argentina- Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry 
from Brazil DS 241 case
144
(hereinafter referred to as the Argentina-Definitive Anti-Dumping on 
Poultry case) In this case Brazil complained of specific anti dumping measures imposed by 
Argentina on poultry from Brazil at the WTO DSM.  This case is relevant because prior to its 
submission to the WTO DSM, the Mercado Comun del Sur (MERCOSUR)
145
 tribunal had ruled in 
Argentina’s favour. In the subsequent case brought by Brazil at the WTO, Argentina argued that the 
MERCOSUR ruling could not be disregarded by the WTO panel but the panel dismissed Argentina’s 
claim.
146
 
 
Cases such as the one between Canada and the US over countervailing duties and anti-dumping 
measures in the soft wood trade have been multilayered and complex.
147
 In that case, Canada 
brought four separate WTO proceedings and four NAFTA proceedings. Private actors or the industry 
in both countries further litigated in the US courts.
148
 This illustrates how duplicative and complex 
proceedings can be. 
 
The Mexico- Tax measures on Soft Drinks case
149
 is also relevant because during the proceedings at 
the WTO DSM (both panel and appellate body), Mexico requested that the WTO DSM should 
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decline jurisdiction and recommend to parties to submit their claims to the NAFTA panel.
150
 Mexico 
was of the view that NAFTA panel could address both the sugar quota and the tax issues but this 
claim presented by Mexico was rejected as the WTO DSM was of the view that the WTO DSU does 
not grant them discretion whether or not to decline jurisdiction of a case brought before them.
151
 
 
The Argentina- Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry case clearly shows re-litigation and how 
the notion of party autonomy as was discussed in section 2.7.2 of chapter two plays out at the WTO 
and would likely to be the case with other international fora. The Mexico- Tax measures on Soft 
Drinks and other beverages (DS 308) case, although was not litigated at the NAFTA panel, shows 
how the lack of hierarchy may play out. One may argue that if there was some kind of hierarchy 
between the WTO and the NAFTA, may be the WTO DSM would not have rejected Mexico request. 
 
The two cases present dimensions which are different from the simple choice of forum as 
demonstrated in the Canada- Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals (DS31) case and this is 
where concerns arise. These concerns can be either party related or system related.
152
 A concern 
would be party related in the sense that it will be issues that concern the parties only, to the exclusion 
of the system itself. A system related concern would be otherwise, it would be related to the regime 
as a whole. A concern that has been noted as a party concern is the issue of costs or expenses. These 
are costs or expenses associated with re-litigation and multiple filings. This concern is for the parties 
and does not have a significant if any impact on the system or the regime. Although the issue of 
costs has been argued to be less of a concern in international law,
153
 it could be a serious concern for 
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the African region which has limited resources. Pauwelyn argues that most parties in international 
disputes are states and states generally do not have a problem with funding.
154
 To a large extent this 
argument is logical as countries such as the United States of America, Canada and the EC have been 
at the WTO DSU repeatedly. Clearly these countries would be asserting their rights and sometimes 
defending their rights, but one may argue that it has been a lot easier for them since they have the 
resources.  
The situation is different from that of the African countries. Poor countries in the African will have 
difficulty funding multiple proceedings or even defending re-litigated cases. A country such as the 
Republic of South Africa ranked as an upper middle income country by the World Bank
155
 is the 
largest economy in Africa. It could be one of those African countries that could afford multiple 
proceedings between the RECs and the TFTA. Re-litigation where South Africa is of the view that a 
previous ruling was not satisfactory could be affordable to her economy. On the other hand South 
Africa’s neighbouring country Lesotho which has been classified as a lower middle income by the 
World Bank
156
would probably have difficulty in engaging in multiple proceedings and re-litigation. 
It is the author’s view that with African countries’ unequal economies; multiple proceedings would 
serve those who can afford it to the exclusion of other poorer countries. Thus, multiple proceedings 
and re-litigation of cases can be a huge burden on the limited developing country budgets. 
Another concern is the issue of inconsistent rulings. This has been classified as a system concern and 
also identified as the main concern in international law.
157
 It is argued that inconsistent rulings may 
leave the dispute unresolved or threaten the stability and legitimacy of a system or regime within 
which judicial bodies exist.
158
 Multiple interpretations of similar concepts by different DSMs may 
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lead to the fragmentation of international law which would in turn defeat the very notion of certainty 
and predictability of a system. The lack of certainty and predictability not only affect the 
governments, the traders and producers are also affected. One can only imagine how confusing 
traders and producers were during the Argentina- Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from 
Brazil DS 241 case. Although the case between the US and Canada over softwood lumber trade did 
not really end up with contradictory decisions, and much as it may elate lawyers as they could make 
a lot of money from such cases, it does show that there is potential for such decisions and if such 
decisions are made, each party would insist on a ruling that favours it and the dispute would remain 
unresolved. 
It is crucial for the RECs and the TFTA, not to engage in contradictory decisions, especially with the 
recent developments in the SADC Tribunal whereby the tribunal was suspended, and subsequently 
renegotiations of the tribunal being called for. It is the author’s view that such developments are 
indicative of the fragile nature of Africa’s regional law. Contradictory decisions are certainly 
undesirable as they could undermine the unity of the African trade regime. 
3.8 Possible Solutions to possible jurisdictional conflicts between the Regional Economic 
Communities and the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Area 
It appears that overlap of jurisdiction is an inevitability in international trade law simply because at 
the WTO under its Article XXIV of the GATT permits the creation of RTAs, which tend to have 
identical obligations to the WTO. In the African region it has been shown in section 2.7.3 of Chapter 
two that the RECs and the envisaged TFTA may have overlap of jurisdiction. These overlap of 
jurisdiction presents opportunities and risks to member states and the risks tied to forum shopping 
which can result in inconsistent rulings and unnecessary expenses. Various writers have discussed 
numerous solutions and it is important to explore if these possible solutions could be useful to the 
RECs and the TFTA arrangement. The possible solutions are res judicata, lis alibi pendens, forum 
non coveniens as well as exclusive choice of forum. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
 
 
 
 
47 
 
 
3.8.1 Forum non conveniens 
Forum non-conveniens permits a judicial body with jurisdiction over a dispute to stay or dismiss 
litigation when there is a more suitable DSM.
159
 It could be argued that, Mexico in its Mexico- Tax 
measures on Soft Drinks) case was requesting the WTO DSU to apply this doctrine, to rule that the 
NAFTA panel is the appropriate forum. This decision would probably be difficult for the WTO DSU 
as it may have to be certain that the dispute presented to it would be resolved at the NAFTA panel. 
This doctrine is widely recognised in domestic courts, particularly in common law systems
160
 but it 
is not popular in the international law arena. The unpopularity may be due to the fact that judicial 
bodies are granted a wide discretion in the application of the doctrine which renders its application 
unpredictable.
161
 It is the author’s view that it is ideal and desirable to have a predictable trade 
regime in Africa for the benefit of governments, traders and producers. This ideal situation cannot be 
paired with an unpredictable doctrine since it may only cause solution and fail to provide one. The 
author submits that forum non conveniens will not suitable for the RECs and TFTA interaction. 
3.8.2 Lis alibi pendens 
The above doctrine provides that proceedings on the same facts cannot be commenced if there are 
parallel proceedings pending in another court.
162
 This doctrine applies to a situation where a ruling 
has not yet been made in a court and then parallel proceedings on the same facts are commenced in 
another court. This is a controversial doctrine in international law as there is no agreement on 
whether it applies in international law or not.
163
 The difficulty with this doctrine in the international 
arena is attributed to the strict conditions that have to be fulfilled in order for it to apply. The specific 
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requirement that would cause a problem is that the earlier court where the matter is filed should be 
able to resolve the legal cause of action brought in the subsequent court. Drawing an analogy form 
the Mexico- Tax measures on Soft Drinks case, the legal cause of action that would have been 
brought before the NAFTA panel had it not been for the US refusal of panel formation would have 
been a claim of violation of a NAFTA rule.  
At the WTO the claim was a violation of a WTO rule. Now according to the doctrine, in the above 
analogy the NAFTA panel would have to be in a position to resolve the legal cause of action brought 
at the WTO DSU. This would prove difficult for the NAFTA panel to execute because it can go as 
far as dealing with rules found in its treaty, rendering it not capable of resolving a legal cause of 
action brought at the WTO DSU. This would then mean that according to the doctrine, the 
requirement would not be fulfilled therefore parallel proceedings would be permitted. 
Similarly, a RECs DSM would have difficulty resolving a legal cause of action brought at the TFTA 
DSM or vice versa. It is the author's view that as with forum non conveniens, the doctrine of lis alibi 
pendens would not be a suitable solution to the problem of parallel proceedings that may arise 
between the RECs and the TFTA. 
3.8.3 Res judicata  
Unlike forum non conveniens and lis alibi pendens, writers agree that res judicata is a recognised 
legal principle
164
 that is applicable before international tribunals.
165
 Res judicata precludes disputants 
form engaging in sequential claims. Thus, it precludes parties from initiating the same litigation 
involving the same claim or cause of action after a court with competent jurisdiction has adjudicated 
the matter.
166
When a court has to determine whether is precluded from hearing the case because of 
an earlier adjudication in another court, it has to consider three elements. The first consideration is 
the parties involved in the two cases. The parties have to be the same. The second consideration or 
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test whether the subject matter in the two cases is the same and the third one is the legal cause of 
action.
167
 
It is the opinion of the writer that for res judicata to effectively resolve the issue of re-litigation, the 
judicial bodies involved must recognise this doctrine as an applicable principle in international law. 
Alternatively, that recognition could be inherent in the founding instruments of the judicial bodies. 
For instance, the arrangement between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations known 
as the ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) seems to have accepted the principle of re judicata 
and it has rules governing the refusal of jurisdiction when another DSM is seized with the matter. 
It is important to note that Article 38 (4) of the draft agreement of the TFTA appreciates that there 
may be inconsistencies between the agreements of the RECS and the TFTA. It goes further to say 
that in that situation; the provisions of the TFTA will prevail. The reason for bringing up this article 
is that it is easy for one to conclude that this provision accepts the doctrine of res judicata, therefore 
the issue of re-litigation would be dissolved. The author is of the view that such a conclusion would 
be flawed since Article 38 (4) only seeks to harmonise the provisions of the RECs and the TFTA and 
such harmonisation would be effective if one is appearing at the TFTA DSM. And even if the RECs 
were to recognise such harmonisation, it does not preclude member states from having a dispute over 
the same provision, obtaining a ruling at the TFTA and then re-litigating at a REC DSM. It is the 
author’s opinion that the doctrine of res judicata remains a possible solution, if the TFTA accepts 
and reflects it in its agreement. 
3.8.3.1 Exclusive Choice of Forum 
The writer is of the opinion that drawing from the doctrine of res judicata, the TFTA may craft its 
DSM provisions in such a manner that it captures the spirit of the doctrine and may even go beyond 
what the doctrine requires. The TFTA DSM as discussed in section 2.7.2 of chapter two does not 
have exclusive jurisdiction. The parties of the TFTA may choose to go to any fora they prefer to 
resolve their trade disputes. The non exclusive nature of the jurisdiction clearly opens gates for 
                                                          
167J Gaurav ‘The Luxury of Forum shopping in International Trade Disputes: Problems and Solutions’ available at 
http://www.cuts-citee.org/pdf/BP07-WTO-11.pdf  (accessed 1 March 2013). 
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forum shopping but this could be controlled by an exclusive choice of forum clause. Such exclusion 
clauses are now being found in other RTAs DSMs such as the ACFTA which reads:
168
  
 
‘Once dispute settlement proceedings have been initiated under this Agreement or any other 
treaty to which the parties to a dispute are parties concerning a particular right or obligation of 
such parties arising from the Framework Agreement or that other treaty, the forum selected by the 
complaining party shall be used to the exclusion of any other for such dispute.’ 
 
The above provision clearly precludes parties from engaging in multiple proceedings but it does not 
necessarily prevent re-litigation. One could argue that after obtaining a ruling from a particular 
judicial body, the matter is closed and re-litigation would be a new case in a new forum. This 
thought is motivated by the fact that litigants are always looking for new ways to approach matters, 
so there will be a need to make the provision watertight and address re-litigation. 
 
Other RTAs such as the NAFTA have a similar provision to that of the ACFTA and it shall be 
further discussed in chapter four where a comparative analysis will be carried out. 
3.9 Conclusion 
It is concluded that issues of choice of forum such as forum shopping has been recognised as a 
concern in the international trade law arena. Numerous examples have been shown through relations 
and interactions between RTAs and the WTO. It is further submitted that not only could this be a 
problem at the WTO level, it is a possible problem in the African region due to the parallel 
jurisdiction between the RECs and the TFTA. The author acknowledges that forum shopping 
simplicita is not a real problem but it is a serious problem when member states have the opportunity 
to engage in multiple proceedings and re-litigation of cases.  It is particularly a concern for the 
African region since the necessary resources are limited and inconsistent rulings could discredit the 
fragile African trade law regime. The solutions that are usually used under domestic law to address 
                                                          
168
Agreement on Dispute Settlement of the Framework Agreement on the Comprehensive Economic Co-operation 
between ASEAN and China available at http://www.asean.org/  (accessed 15 March 2013). 
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the above concerns are not suitable but borrowing from the doctrine of res judicata, member states 
may choose to nip multiple proceedings and re-litigation in the bud, so to speak metaphorically by 
having an exclusive choice of forum. It is an attractive resolution for the RECs and the TFTA since 
the TFTA is still at the negotiations stage and forum shopping seems to be an endogenous problem 
inherent in the relevant treaties. This resolution has been explored by other RTAs such as ACFTA 
and NAFTA. The approach of NAFTA shall be analysed in chapter to gain insight on how it has 
worked for that trade regime and if it will be suitable for the TFTA. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: EFFICACY OF THE FORUM 
SELECTION CLAUSE AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE PROPOSED TRIPARTITE 
FREE TRADE AREA 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
It has been established in the previous chapters that there is a possibility of jurisdictional overlap 
between the regional economic communities (RECs) and the proposed tripartite free trade area 
(TFTA). It has further been established that this overlap may create an opportunity or risk of forum 
shopping. This has been demonstrated through cases and possible solutions have been highlighted. 
This chapter will explore how the issue of forum shopping has been approached by the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) and the efficacy 
of the NAFTA choice of forum clause that seek to address the issue of jurisdictional overlap between 
NAFTA and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. This analysis will introduce the NAFTA 
and contrast its DSM with that of the World Trade Organisation. It will further examine the 
jurisdiction of the NAFTA DSM, and that of the WTO DSM. The aforementioned examination will 
provide the basis of the discussion of the propensity of jurisdictional conflict between the two 
mechanisms and the extent to which the NAFTA forum selection clause is able to resolve such 
conflict. The chapter will culminate by discussing recommendations for the design of the TFTA in 
view of the NAFTA approach as well as judicial cooperation between the TFTA and the RECs. 
 
4.2 North American Free Trade Agreement Overview 
  
The NAFTA is a comprehensive agreement notified under article twenty four
169
 of the general 
agreement on tariffs and trade (GATT). On the first day of January 1994, NAFTA came into effect 
with a primary goal of eliminating restrictions on trade and investment.
170
 NAFTA is an extension of 
                                                          
169
Article XXIV, GATT permits the creation of customs territories. 
170Kondonassis A.J, Malliarias A.G and Paraskevopoulos C ‘NAFTA: Past, present and future’ available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084662 (accessed 10 April 2013). 
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the free trade agreement between Canada and the United States of America to include Mexico. 
NAFTA goes beyond the traditional elimination of trade barriers objective to include the so called 
new generation issues such as promotion of fair competition, investment and provision of adequate 
and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in each NAFTA party’s 
territory.
171
 Since its implementation, NAFTA has been celebrated in some quarters as a tool that 
would create jobs and raise standard of living in the respective member states and has also been 
condemned for causing loss of jobs and not bringing changes that were anticipated.
172
 NAFTA’s 
value continues to be controversial and it is the writer’s opinion that this controversy may largely 
emanate from the fact that NAFTA is composed of countries with disparate levels of development. 
Canada and the US being industrial states and Mexico at a level much lower than that of the two 
countries in terms of industrialisation. 
 
NAFTA, like most of regional trade organisations has created institutions within its organisation and 
the one that is relevant to our discussion is the one that deals with dispute settlement. It is an 
important institution because disagreements are bound to arise and in lieu of this fact, NAFTA has 
created what some have described as an impartial rules based system that is able to resolve disputes 
that may arise between the NAFTA parties.
173
 
4.3 North American Free Trade Agreement Dispute Settlement Mechanism 
The NAFTA establishes its dispute settlement mechanism under chapters eleven, nineteen and 
twenty of its founding agreement. Chapter eleven primarily deals with disputes between a party and 
an investor from another party.
174
Chapter nineteen has a limited scope which deals with the review 
of final anti dumping and countervailing duty determinations
175
 and it operates under national laws 
                                                          
171
 Article 102-Ojectives available at http://www.nafta-sec-alena.org/en/view.aspx?conID=590&mtpiID=122 
(accessed 17 April 2013).       
172Kondonassis A.J, Malliarias A.G and Paraskevopoulos C ‘NAFTA: Past, present and future’ available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1084662 (accessed 10 April 2013). 
173‘The NAFTA at five: Overview’ available at http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/agr-acc/nafta-alena/nafta5_section03.aspx (accessed 10 April 2013). 
174
NAFTA, Chapter eleven, Article 1115 to 1138 available at http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/en/view.aspx?conID=590&mtpiID=142 (accessed 17 April 2013). 
175
NAFTA, Chapter nineteen, Article 1904 available at http://www.nafta-
alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=152#A1904 (accessed 17 April 2013). 
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rather than regional or international trade laws. Chapter twenty addresses institutional arrangements 
and dispute settlement procedures and it is a government to government dispute settlement.
176
 The 
NAFTA has a potential of raising a wide range of legal issues relevant to international trade law, 
however in order to stay in the scope of the present discussion this section will only focus on the 
general dispute settlement mechanism, that is chapter twenty. 
4.3.1 Dispute resolution under chapter 20 of the North American Free Trade Agreement 
The dispute settlement provisions of chapter 20 provide a means of resolving disputes related to the 
application and interpretation of the NAFTA among the NAFTA parties.
177
Chapter 20 sets out three 
main steps that are intended to resolve disputes. Similar to the World Trade Organisation’s dispute 
settlement unit
178
 (WTO DSU) and other international organisations, the process of resolution of 
disputes under chapter 20 is commenced by consultations between the parties. There has to be a 
request for consultations in writing regarding any actual or proposed measure or any other matter 
that the requesting party considers may affect the operation of the NAFTA.
179
 Parties to a dispute are 
expected to make an attempt at resolving the dispute through consultations as Article 2006 (5) of the 
NAFTA stipulates that:  
 
‘The consulting Parties shall make every attempt to arrive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of 
any matter through consultations under this Article or other consultative provisions of this 
Agreement.’ 
 
NAFTA places a lot of emphasis on resolving disputes at the consultation phase. If the parties fail to 
reach an agreement through consultations within a stipulated period of time, the matter may then be 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
176
NAFTA, Chapter twenty, Article 2003 to 2019 available at http://www.nafta-
alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=153 (accessed 17 April 2013). 
177Gantz D ‘Dispute Settlement under the NAFTA and the WTO: Choice of Forum Opportunities and Risks for the 
NAFTA Parties’ (1999) Am.U.Int’l. L. Rev.1030. 
178
Annex 2-Understanding on rules and procedures governing the settlement of disputes, Article 3. 
179
Consultations, Article 2006 available at http://www.nafta-alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=153#A2006 
(accessed 17 April 2013). 
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referred for good offices, conciliation and mediation by any party to the dispute to the NAFTA Free 
Trade Commission which has the responsibility of overseeing the implementation of the NAFTA 
and resolving disputes.
180
 This step is also similar to the one provided for in Article 5 of the 
agreement dealing with dispute settlement at the WTO.  The difference is that good offices, 
conciliation and mediation are voluntary at the WTO DSM whilst they are compulsory at NAFTA. If 
the Free Trade Commission convenes and there is still no resolution, party to the dispute may 
request establishment of an arbitral panel
181
 which would then arbitrate the matter. According to the 
NAFTA agreement, the NAFTA parties have to maintain a panel roster of up to thirty individuals.
182
 
These members are appointed by consensus for terms of three years.
183
 Similar to the WTO DSU, 
the panelists are expected to have expertise in international trade law or policy and generally matters 
covered in the relevant agreements.
184
Unlike the WTO DSU where panels are composed of three 
panelists,
185
 NAFTA panels are composed of five panelists.
186
 Following arbitration, the panelists 
                                                          
180
The Free Trade Commission comprises of cabinet level representatives ( trade ministers) of the three NAFTA 
parties see Article 2001 available at http://www.nafta-alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=153#A2006 
(accessed 17 April 2013). 
181
Request for an arbitral panel, Article 2008 available at http://www.nafta-
alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=153#A2001 (accessed 17 April 2013). 
182
Article 2009.1 available at http://www.nafta-alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=153#A2001 (accessed 17 
April 2013) 
183
Article 2009.1 available at http://www.nafta-alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=153#A2001 (accessed 17 
April 2013) 
184
Article 2009.1 available at http://www.nafta-alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=153#A2001 (accessed 17 
April 2013). See also Article 8 (1), WTO DSU. 
185
WTO DSU Article 8(5). 
186
Article 2011 available at http://www.nafta-alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=153#A2001 (accessed 17 
April 2013). 
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have to issue an initial panel report on which the parties to a dispute may submit written 
comments.
187
 
After the initial report follows the final report on which the disputing parties have to agree on the 
resolution of the dispute which normally shall be similar to the determinations and recommendations 
of the panel.
188
 Although it may seem as if the arbitral panel is playing a facilitative role than an 
authoritative one of resolving a dispute, failure by the affected parties to implement the final report 
may result in serious consequences that may be acted upon promptly. If the final report is not 
implemented or another mutually satisfactory agreement has not been reached, the complaining 
party may retaliate. Retaliation would be suspension of the application to the party complained 
against of the benefits of equivalent effect until such time the partiers reach an agreement on the 
resolution of the dispute.
189
 
To a large extent the NAFTA DSM mirrors the dispute settlement provided in Article twenty three 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994). They are both rules based 
systems with formal adjudicatory decision making process and clear provisions on implementation 
mechanisms. The two systems incorporate dispute settlement that is based on consultations, 
conciliation and binding proceedings where consultations fail to bring forth resolution. The two 
systems also impose time limits for the various stages of dispute resolution. It is therefore apparent 
from the drafting, sequencing of stages of dispute settlement and the substantive content that the 
NAFTA DSM is modelled on the WTO Dispute Settlement Unit (DSU). A notable difference would 
be the fact that unlike the WTO DSU which has an appellate body, the NAFTA DSM does not have 
one. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
187
Initial Report, Article 2016 available at http://www.nafta-alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=153#A2001 
(accessed 17 April 2013). 
188
Implementation of Panel Report, Article 2018 available at http://www.nafta-
alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=153#A2001 (accessed 17 April 2013). 
189
Non-implementation,Article 2019 available at http://www.nafta-
alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=153#A2001 (accessed 17 April 2013). 
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4.3.2 Jurisdiction of the North American Free Trade Agreement dispute settlement mechanism 
 
The jurisdiction of NAFTA chapter 20 dispute resolution mechanism is captured as follows:
190
 
 
‘Except for the matters covered in Chapter Nineteen (Review and Dispute Settlement in   
Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Matters) and as otherwise provided in this 
Agreement, the  dispute settlement provisions of this Chapter shall apply with respect to 
the avoidance or settlement of all disputes between the Parties regarding the 
interpretation or application of this Agreement or wherever a Party considers that an 
actual or proposed measure of another Party is  or would be inconsistent with the 
obligations of this Agreement or cause nullification or  impairment in the sense of 
Annex 2004.’ 
 
The first point to note is that chapter 20 relates to application and interpretation of the 
NAFTA. NAFTA’s coverage is expansive and is only logical that the subject matter of its 
jurisdiction is broad. NAFTA covers areas such as trade in automotive sector
191
, textile and 
apparel goods
192
, rules of origin
193
, customs procedures
194
, energy and basic 
                                                          
190
Recourse to dispute settlement procedures, Article 2004 available at http://www.nafta-
alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=153#A2001 (accessed 17 April 2013). 
191
 Trade and Investment in automotive sector, Chapter three, Annex 300A available at http://www.nafta-
alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299 (accessed 17 April 2013). 
192
Textile and Apparel goods, Chapter three, Annex 300B available at http://www.nafta-
alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299 (accessed 17 April 2013). 
193
Rules of Origin, Chapter five available at http://www.nafta-alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299 (accessed 17 April 
2013). 
194
Customs procedures, Chapter five available at http://www.nafta-alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299 (accessed 17 
April 2013). 
195
Energy and basic petrochemicals, Chapter six available at http://www.nafta-alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299 
(accessed 17 April 2013). 
196
Government Procurement, Chapter ten available at http://www.nafta-alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299 (accessed 
17 April 2013). 
197
Agriculture and Sanitary and Phytosanitary measures, Chapter seven available at http://www.nafta-
alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299 (accessed 17 April 2013). 
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petrochemicals
195
, government procurement
196
 and agriculture.
 197
 All these areas would be 
subject to chapter 20 disciplines and it should be noted that although chapter eleven and 
chapter nineteen provide special procedures for settlement of disputes between investors and 
states as well as for the review of anti dumping and countervailing determinations, questions 
regarding the application and interpretation of those sections could be addressed under 
chapter 20.
 198
 
The second point to note is that chapter 20 is also applicable in instances where a 
complaining party is of the view that an actual or proposed measure by another party is or 
would be inconsistent with the obligations of the NAFTA or may cause nullification or 
impairment in the relevant NAFTA provisions. 
The NAFTA DSM has non exclusive jurisdiction. The parties’ recourse to the WTO is 
expressly preserved by Article 2005 (1) which provides:
199
 
  ‘Subject to paragraphs 2, 3 and 4, disputes regarding any matter arising  under both this 
Agreement and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade , any agreement negotiated 
thereunder, or any successor agreement (GATT), may be settled in either forum at the 
discretion of the complaining Party.’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
198Gantz D ‘Dispute Settlement under the NAFTA and the WTO: Choice of Forum Opportunities and Risks for the 
NAFTA Parties’ (1999) Am.U.Int’l. L. Rev.1034. 
199
GATT Dispute settlement, Article 2005 (1) available at http://www.nafta-
alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=153#A2004 (accessed 17 April 2013). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
59 
 
 
It should be noted that where a NAFTA party decides to initiate an action at the WTO against 
another NAFTA party and third NAFTA party expresses interest in the matter and prefers the 
NAFTA DSM, the three parties are expected to agree on a single forum and if they cannot 
reach an agreement, the dispute would normally be settled under the NAFTA DSM.
200
 
Although there is this non exclusive jurisdiction, once a complainant has selected a forum at 
which they wish the dispute to be settled, that forum must be used to the exclusion of all 
others.
201
 This requirement will be referred to as the NAFTA forum selection clause and its 
efficacy will be tested in relation to its interaction with the WTO DSU. 
4.4 Jurisdiction of the World Trade Organisation dispute settlement unit 
The WTO DSM has jurisdiction over all disputes arising from the WTO covered 
agreements.
202
 A complaining member state must request consultations pursuant to the 
relevant WTO provisions. Article twenty three sets out conditions under which a member 
state may request consultations. As with the NAFTA DSM, the WTO DSU allows disputes 
concerning violation of a WTO agreement which equates to inconsistencies referred to in 
article 2004 of the NAFTA.  The WTO DSU also refers to nullification or impairment of a 
benefit which we had also come across at the aforementioned article. 
Unlike the NAFTA DSM, WTO DSU has exclusive jurisdiction over all disputes that arise 
from the WTO covered agreements. Article twenty three of the dispute settlement agreement 
mandates compulsory recourse
203
 by WTO members to the WTO DSM. The WTO 
jurisdiction as already mentioned in section 3.3 of chapter three would appear to be 
                                                          
200
GATT Dispute settlement, Article 2005 (2) available at http://www.nafta-
alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=153#A2004 (accessed 17 April 2013). 
201
GATT Dispute settlement, Article 2005 (6) available at http://www.nafta-
alena.gc.ca/en/view.aspx?x=299&mtpiID=153#A2004 (accessed 17 April 2013). 
202WTO ‘The Legal Texts’Article 23 (1) of the DSU. 
203‘...they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.’ Own italics for 
emphasis. 
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applicable to all trade disputes notwithstanding the fact that there might be other relevant 
fora. Although there seem to be an obligation to use the WTO DSU
204
, the complainant still 
has a choice to opt for the WTO DSU or the NAFTA DSM.  
Article twenty three of the DSU will not preclude a NAFTA party from invoking the NAFTA 
dispute settlement process. Therefore NAFTA is able to hear a dispute that concerns a 
measure that potentially breaches both the NAFTA and the WTO agreement.
205
 Unlike the 
NAFTA DSM, the WTO DSU does not contain any express or forum selection clauses 
allowing for disputes concerning WTO covered agreements to be resolved in other fora. It 
would appear from the above-mentioned observation and the wording of article twenty three 
of the DSU agreement that the WTO DSU is designed to be the sole forum for the resolution 
of disputes concerning WTO covered agreements. 
4.5 Jurisdictional overlap between the North American Free Trade Agreement and the 
World Trade Organisation 
 
Jurisdictional overlap which may lead to conflict thereof can only occur where the NAFTA 
and WTO obligations are binding on both parties involved in a dispute.
206
 All parties to the 
NAFTA are members of the WTO.
207
 Accordingly, disputes between parties to the NAFTA 
may be subject to both the WTO and the NAFTA DSM. The above observation has also been 
acknowledged in article 2005 of NAFTA. NAFTA and the WTO agreement cover essentially 
the same areas and some substantive provisions under the NAFTA mirror those in the WTO 
                                                          
204WTO ‘The Legal Texts’Article 23 (1) of the DSU. 
205
Example, Argentina- Definitive Anti-Dumping Duties on Poultry from Brazil DS 241 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds241sum_e.pdf (accessed 8 March 2013). 
206
See section 2.7.3 of chapter 2 of this paper for definition of jurisdictional overlap. 
207
Canada, Mexico and the United States of America have been members of the WTO since 1 January 1995; see 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (accessed 18 April 2013). 
208Gantz D ‘Dispute Settlement under the NAFTA and the WTO: Choice of Forum Opportunities and Risks for the 
NAFTA Parties’ (1999) Am.U.Int’l. L. Rev.1037. 
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agreements.
208
 These similarities in the breadth and scope of the two agreements may result 
in trade disputes being brought in either one of the DSMs. 
 
As mentioned in section 4.3.2 of this chapter, NAFTA does not attempt to prevent a WTO 
DSU from making determinations on the rights under the NAFTA agreements. On the other 
hand, the compulsory jurisdiction of the WTO DSU attracts disputes concerning violation of 
WTO covered agreements, which encompass a wide spectrum of trade disputes which may 
fall within the jurisdictional competence of the NAFTA DSM. As a result of the compulsory 
nature of the jurisdiction of the WTO DSU, the WTO panel may be inclined to exercise its 
jurisdiction notwithstanding the fact that such an action may lead to jurisdictional conflict.
209
 
As mentioned in section 3.2 of chapter three, jurisdictional overlap may lead to forum 
shopping which may have unpleasant consequences such as inconsistent and contradictory 
judgements. In order to avoid such consequences, NAFTA has included a forum selection 
clause to regulate choice of forum. 
4.6 North American Free Trade selection of forum clause 
Jurisdictional overlap has been recognised by NAFTA and other regional trade agreements
210
 
as a possible problem. This recognition is demonstrated by the inclusion of an express 
provision aimed at avoiding jurisdictional conflict. This provision, which we may refer to as 
the selection of forum clause seeks to address jurisdictional conflict by regulating the choice 
and use of forum in a dispute. NAFTA forum selection clause requires that in cases where a 
complaint can be brought before the NAFTA panel as well as under the WTO DSU, the 
forum selected by the parties shall become the exclusive forum for the dispute. Article 2005 
(6) of the NAFTA provides that: ‘once dispute settlement procedures have been initiated...the 
                                                          
209
Mexico- Tax measures on Soft Drinks case-Although the case never proceeded at the NAFTA DSM, 
the WTO panel did not give much consideration to the fact Mexico had already requested establishment 
of a panel at NAFTA. 
210
ASEAN- China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) has a selection of forum clause, US-Central American Free Trade 
Article 20.3, US bilateral FTAs such as US-Singapore, US-Australia contain forum selection clauses see 
http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (accessed 22 April 2013). 
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forum selected shall be used to the exclusion of the other.’ Initiation in this context means a 
request for an establishment of a panel at the WTO DSU
211
 whilst under the NAFTA chapter 
20 it would be the request for conciliation by the Free Trade Commission.
212
 
Prima facie, the NAFTA forum selection clause could be effective in resolving the issues 
associated with jurisdictional overlap. These issues or concerns, namely multiple fillings and 
re-litigation have been identified and discussed in section 3.7 of chapter three. The intention 
of the NAFTA forum selection clause is to prevent parallel or multiple   proceedings as a 
party is prohibited from initiating proceedings before the WTO panel and then initiating 
duplicitous proceedings before the NAFTA panel. This prohibition applies vice versa. Article 
2005 of NAFTA seems to address re-litigation as once a forum is selected for a dispute, it is 
regarded as the exclusive forum for that dispute and that dispute should not be referred to 
another adjudicatory body. 
It should be noted that there has not really been instances where NAFTA parties have 
violated article 2005 (6). NAFTA parties tend to choose either NAFTA DSM or the WTO 
DSU, depending on which one will end with a favourable outcome.
213
 The selection 
processes in on a case by case basis. 
4.6.1 Efficacy of the North American Free Trade selection of forum clause 
In cases where a question of jurisdiction has been brought before the WTO DSU, clear 
answers have not been extracted. For instance in the Mexico- Tax measures on Soft Drinks 
case
214
 the appellate body left unanswered the question as to how a WTO tribunal should 
deal with a forum selection clause in a regional trade agreement. This scenario brings out an 
important limitation of the efficacy of the NAFTA forum selection clause in achieving its 
                                                          
211
 GATT Dispute settlement, Article 2005 (7) available at http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/en/view.aspx?conID=590&mtpiID=153#A2005 (accessed 22 April 2013) 
212
 GATT Dispute settlement, Article 2007 available at http://www.nafta-sec-
alena.org/en/view.aspx?conID=590&mtpiID=153#A2007 (accessed 22 April 2013). 
213
Agricultural Products Tarrification Case (US vs Canada)- US requested consultations at NAFTA. The dispute 
involved both GATT and NAFTA issues but the US did not have an effective alternative to NAFTA chapter 20 as 
Canada was implementing WTO obligations which lead to alleged violations of the NAFTA, Canada- Certain 
Measures Concerning Periodicals (DS31) case (US vs Canada)- US requested consultations under the WTO DSU. 
214 Mexico- Tax measures on Soft Drinks and other beverages (DS 308) available at 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/1pagesum_e/ds308sum_e.pdf  (accessed 30 January 2013). 
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aim. In simple terms, the forum selection clause in the NAFTA may not be applicable at the 
WTO. The writer hereof is of the opinion that NAFTA panel would not have a difficulty with 
giving effect to the NAFTA forum selection clause. This aforementioned opinion is based on 
the assumption that since the forum selection clause is contained within the NAFTA, there 
should not be much contention. 
It is submitted that the abovementioned limitation could be augmented or pacified by a 
tribunal faced with a question of whether jurisdiction should be exercised by it or otherwise. 
It is further submitted that where there is no cooperation between the concerned adjudicatory 
bodies, it is entirely at the discretion of a tribunal faced with such a question as the 
abovementioned one to be receptive to arguments for the application of forum selection 
clauses contained in regional trade agreements. 
Another limitation of the NAFTA forum selection clause is that it may appear to be 
applicable where the same dispute could be brought before the NAFTA panel or the WTO 
panel. Article 2005 (1) of the NAFTA reads:  
‘ ... disputes regarding any matter arising under both this Agreement and the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade , any agreement negotiated thereunder, or any successor 
agreement (GATT), may be settled in either forum at the discretion of the complaining 
Party.’ 
It is the writer’s opinion that the above clause could be interpreted as meaning the same 
dispute arising out of the two different agreements. The writer holds that view because 
generally a forum selection clause is meant to preclude parallel proceedings and re-litigation 
in respect of the same dispute, rather than different disputes. The difficulty is that the dispute 
may arise in the different agreements but the NAFTA panel and the WTO may construe the 
word dispute differently. The legal dispute would be different in each forum even if the de 
facto dispute is fundamentally the same. Thus the legal basis of a dispute would be in two 
different agreements. 
For instance, a NAFTA party may allege violation of national treatment under the NAFTA 
whilst it is possible to do so under the relevant WTO covered agreement. The legal action 
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would be different but the measure complained of would be the same. Therefore if an 
adjudicating body opts to narrowly construe dispute by focusing on the legal dispute or de 
jure dispute, a forum selection clause will be ineffective because the legal action can never 
be the same if based on two different agreements. At the NAFTA panel the proceedings will 
be in respect of the NAFTA whilst before the WTO panel the proceedings will be in respect 
of a WTO covered agreement.  
Once again, as like the question of whether to exercise jurisdiction or not, it is at the 
discretion of a judicial body faced with the task of determining whether it is the same dispute 
to opt for a narrow construction or broader construction. A broader construction of dispute 
appears to be the option that could address jurisdictional conflict since it will look beyond the 
legal basis and define dispute by reference to the trade measure complained of or other issues 
that are subject the subject of the complaint.  
It is the author’s view that a narrow construction appears to place adjudicatory bodies in 
glass houses, indifferent to the existence of jurisdictional overlap and its possible 
consequences. This indifference can result in a judicial body exercising jurisdiction over 
aspects of a dispute for which it has competence, oblivious to the fact that the dispute could 
be better resolved in another forum. This could lead to multiple proceedings over the same de 
facto dispute and eventually contradictory decisions. 
This narrow construction could be demonstrated in the Mexico- Tax measures on Soft Drinks 
case.
215
 Although Mexico in its preliminary arguments did not request the WTO to test the 
application of the NAFTA forum selection clause, the WTO appellate body was faced with a 
matter composed of more than one aspect which only one could be resolved by the WTO. In 
view of the fact that it was a broad trade dispute, Mexico requested the panel to declare by 
way of a preliminary ruling that the matter that the dispute in its totality went beyond the 
WTO jurisdiction since NAFTA the panel could address the matter as a whole.
216
 In this case 
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the NAFTA panel was in a position to consider both the legality of the United States of 
America (US) quotas on import of Mexican sugar and the appropriateness of Mexico’s 
retaliatory measure under the NAFTA. 
The above claim by Mexico was rejected and in its response, the panel considered that the 
DSU gave it no discretion to decline jurisdiction once a WTO member has requested a panel 
concerning the violation of its WTO right.
217
 The WTO then focused on the dispute in 
respect of which the US had requested the establishment of a panel. The WTO confined itself 
to the de jure dispute and did not consider the dispute holistically but instead ‘salami sliced’ 
the dispute to address its share. 
4.7 Lessons and Recommendations for the proposed Tripartite Free Trade Agreement 
4.7.1 Recommendation one: Inclusion of a forum selection clause in the proposed 
Tripartite Free Trade Agreement 
 
Although the negotiators of the anticipated tripartite free trade agreement (TFTA) cannot be 
certain whether a forum selection clause would have any effect on the three regional 
economic communities (RECs) discussed in section 2.1 of chapter two, it is submitted and 
recommended that such a clause should be included in the TFTA. A clear advantage is that a 
forum selection clause would be applicable under the TFTA DSM; therefore it would assist 
in avoiding conflicts of jurisdiction. It would assist in the maintenance of regional trade law 
jurisprudence by avoidance of duplication of judgements related to the same matter. For 
instance, if partner state in both the TFTA and the East African Community initiates a matter 
at the Eastern African Court of Justice (EACJ), and simultaneously initiates the same matter 
at the TFTA DSM, the TFTA can invoke the forum selection clause and refuse to exercise 
jurisdiction on such a matter. 
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However, as the Mexico- Tax measures on Soft Drinks case
218
, has demonstrated (although 
Mexico did not raise the claim of forum selection clause), forum exclusion clause may not 
prevent the respondent in the original forum from initiating proceedings before another 
forum. This observation buttresses the point that ultimately it is at the discretion of a tribunal 
faced with the task of testing the applicability of a forum selection clause to determine its 
effectiveness. In light of the aforementioned observation, it remains unclear whether a forum 
selection clause suggested for inclusion in the TFTA would be effective at the RECs DSMs. 
The RECs DSMs could be inclined to follow a jurisdictional analysis which is based on a 
parochial desire to maintain their legitimacy and relevance.  
The emphasis of the above argument is that assuming the TFTA includes a forum selection 
clause similar to the one in the NAFTA, a TFTA party who disregards the forum selection 
clause under the TFTA and initiates proceedings at the EACJ would be liable for that 
violation before the TFTA DSM but there would be no legal impediment against double or 
successive proceedings since TFTA DSM and the EACJ would be considering different 
matters under different applicable law. This approach would definitely defeat the purpose of 
a forum selection clause because it would render the forum selection clause valid at the 
TFTA only. Therefore a matter that has been settled at the TFTA could be re-litigated at the 
RECs DSMs. 
Since the East African Court of Justice (EACJ), the Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa courts (COMESA court) and the dispute settlement under Annex VI of the 
SADC trade protocol do not have a forum selection clause
219
, it would be logical for the 
RECs to take a holistic approach in terms of considering the broader definition of dispute, 
that is the de facto dispute and also in terms of the outlook of the general administration of 
justice. In this regard, the RECs should when faced with overlapping or successive disputes 
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consider applying principles of private international law such as res judicata
220
 and where 
principles are not applicable, apply comity as part of judicial cooperation within the African 
trade law arena.  
As for the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a lot or very little could be 
said about it. In section 2.5 of chapter two it is mentioned that the SADC tribunal has was 
suspended and later a resolution was made to re-negotiate the SADC tribunal. It appears that 
SADC tribunal is now in limbo and suffering a serious democratic deficit.
221
 The attention 
that it may have grabbed during its demise of suspension has since fizzled off as there is not 
much discussion about it in the media or within the academic community. Be that as it may 
its saga continues on the ground as a South African court has issued a judgement which 
confirms some aspects of the SADC tribunal judgement that was made against the Republic 
of Zimbabwe in an earlier ruling.
222
 The progress or rather the regress that has since occurred 
is the view that summit of August 2012 has expressed, that is, to limit access to the tribunal 
to states only.
223
 SADC at this stage of re-looking at the tribunal could introduce some 
positive aspects such as an exclusive forum selection clause that could regulate choice of 
forum between the SADC tribunal and the TFTA DSM. In the meantime the 
recommendation of application of comity applies for the dispute settlement under Annex VI. 
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4.7.2 Recommendation two: Judicial cooperation between the anticipated Tripartite 
Free Trade Area and the three regional economic communities 
As a way of assisting the region’s legal systems to work together in harmony, rather than at 
cross purposes, especially since there is a possibility of inconsistent rulings
224
, the three 
RECs would have to consider the application of comity. Comity is a domestic law principle 
designed to instil judicial restraint in cases where there are issues of overlapping 
jurisdiction.
225
 It has been argued that comity is a concept with a long legal and political 
pedigree
226
 and described as almost having as many meanings as sovereignty.
227
 From the 
above descriptions it is deducible that the doctrine of comity has not really crystallised in the 
international legal arena. 
Comity does not impose a legal obligation on the courts but it is rather a flexible doctrine that 
enables cooperation of adjudicating bodies within the international legal community.
228
 It 
allows a court to decline to exercise jurisdiction in matters that it deems would be 
appropriately adjudicated by another forum or that the other forum maybe more competent to 
hear the matter.  In this regard, it could function as a principle for resolving issues 
associated with overlapping jurisdiction. A court faced with a case that involves overlapping 
or successive proceedings would be permitted under comity to limit its jurisdiction where it 
considers that exercise of that jurisdiction would be inappropriate in that particular matter. 
 
Although this is an attractive option for the RECs DSMs, they may be unwilling to use their 
inherent discretionary powers to apply this doctrine. This may be due to the fact that the said 
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DSMs may view this approach as diminution to their esteem and relevance and most 
importantly from the perspective of the African region where resources are limited; it may be 
viewed as a threat to the security of funds generated through court process. 
In order to retreat from the abovementioned possible perceptions, the RECs DSMs would 
have to retrace their purpose, recognise and appreciate the ‘bigger picture’ which is 
integration. It is the author’s view that integration would not bring change and bear benefits 
to the African region if it only goes so far as stating the rules of the game, which is how trade 
is supposed to be conducted between nations but disintegrate when it relates to addressing 
violation of those rules. The author hereof submits that the RECs DSMs, as well as the TFTA 
DSM would have to acknowledge judicial comity as a means of integration whereby the 
EACJ can stay proceedings where there are related proceedings before the TFTA. It should 
be noted that declining jurisdiction does not equate to deference to a superior judicial body as 
there is no hierarchy between the RECs and the TFTA DSM. As Slaughter sums it up:
229
  
‘Comity requires more than consultation born of intellectual curiosity. Its expressions and 
appreciation of different assignments and a global allocation of judicial responsibility; 
sharpened by the realization that the performance of one’s court’s function increasingly 
requires cooperation with others. On the other hand, it does not import subordination or 
even the more subtle constraints of ritual deference.’ 
The writer hereof submits that using the inherent powers in the RECs DSMs to apply comity 
could be a useful pragmatic tool to solve issues of jurisdictional overlap where principles of 
private international law such as res judicata are not applicable. This form of jurisdictional 
cooperation is therefore recommended for the RECs when faced with jurisdictional overlap 
issues. The UNCLOS tribunal will be examined in the next section as it has experienced a 
multi-faceted case and in the process applied a holistic view in that case, which lead to it 
declining to exercise jurisdiction. 
 4.7.2.1 Experience of comity in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
One of the cases where it was found that a dispute before one tribunal was inextricably 
connected to another antecedent or concurrent dispute is the Southern Bluefin Tuna (New 
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Zealand v Japan; Australia v Japan) provisional measures case
230
 (hereinafter referred to as 
the Southern Bluefin Tuna case). In 1993, Australia, Japan and New Zealand a convention on 
the conservation of southern bluefin tuna (hereinafter referred to as the 1993 Tuna 
Convention). Japan later unilaterally decided to engage in what it called an ‘experimental 
fishing program’ which it legality was then challenged by Australia and New Zealand under 
the 1993 Tuna Convention, the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 
and customary international law.
231
 Acknowledging that the 1993 Tuna Convention and the 
UNCLOS were applicable to the dispute, the UNCLOS arbitral tribunal found that carving 
out or ‘salami slicing’232 elements of a dispute for adjudication was unwarranted. The 
tribunal was of the view that finding that the UNCLOS dispute was distinct from the 1993 
Tuna Convention would be artificial.
233
 The tribunal declined jurisdiction over the UNCLOS 
part on the basis of its single dispute theory despite the compulsory jurisdiction of the 
UNCLOS.
234
 
This case demonstrates that formal coordination among international tribunals could address 
the issues of jurisdictional overlap which tend to lead to segmentation of international law 
and ultimately conflicting regimes. It further demonstrates how adoption of a principle such 
as comity could assist in resolving such issues. 
4.7.2.2 Threshold of application of comity 
A question that might linger in the minds of those considering applying comity maybe whether 
considering broader issues in trade cases would not open floodgates-type scenario. The above 
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concern was noted in the Mexico- Tax measures on Soft Drinks case
235
 where it was noted that 
considering broader issues of that case would leave the factors which could be taken into account 
limitless. This concern seems to be valid to the extent of considering the circumstances in which the 
power to apply judicial comity should be exercised by a judicial body. In view of this concern it 
would be prudent for adjudicating bodies to exercise inherent powers cautiously and in the interest 
of the overall system. 
Therefore, the proposed approach for the RECs DSMs, which is to exercise their inherent powers to 
decline jurisdiction might create uncertainty in the adjudication of trade disputes if left 
untrammelled. It is the writer’s view that the threshold for application f comity at the RECs DSMs 
and the TFTA nexus could be confined to situations where the disputes arising in the TFTA and the 
RECs trade agreements are inextricably connected. These could be concurrent or antecedent 
disputes. 
 
4.8 Conclusion 
 
It has been observed that the NAFTA dispute settlement procedure, particularly settlement under 
chapter twenty of the NAFTA possesses characteristics similar to that of the WTO. Both systems 
have clearly defined steps that should be followed during dispute resolution process. The difference 
that has been note between the two systems is that unlike the WTO dispute settlement, NAFTA does 
not have an appeals procedure. It has been established in this chapter that the subject matter of 
NAFTA overlaps with that of the WTO agreement. As a result, disputes at the NAFTA may overlap 
with disputes under the WTO. In view of the fact that there is a possibility of the abovementioned 
overlap, NAFTA contains a forum selection clause that is meant   to address disputes that may arise 
under both the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)  which is a WTO covered 
agreement and the NAFTA. 
 
The NAFTA forum selection clause makes any selected forum exclusive. This means that once a 
dispute settlement procedure has been initiated under either the NAFTA or the WTO, the other 
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forum is precluded from exercising jurisdiction over that particular matter.  It has been noted in this 
chapter that although the NAFTA parties have not violated their forum selection clause, this clause 
may not be able to prevent states from re-framing their dispute under the WTO law. The writer is of 
the view that the NAFTA forum selection clause may only have effect in s far as the NAFTA is 
concerned but may not be validated at the WTO since it would not be a WTO covered agreement 
violation. It is difficult to predict how the WTO may receive a forum selection clause if it was to be 
laid as a claim before the WTO panel. For the question of forum selection to arise the dispute has to 
the same hence it is important how the court or tribunal would construe dispute. Two possible 
opposing approaches arise, that is the narrow construction of dispute, which would confine itself to 
the legal basis of the dispute. This narrow approach has been referred to a de jure dispute. On the 
other hand, a court faced with a question of the applicability of a forum selection clause may opt for 
a broader construction which considers the broader issues surrounding the case. We refer to this as a 
de facto dispute. It is submitted that the broader construction of dispute is preferable as the narrow 
one would render the forum selection clause ineffective. 
 
In light of the analysis of the efficacy of the NAFTA forum selection clause, the writer hereof 
recommends its inclusion in the TFTA. The reason for the inclusion of a forum selection clause is 
that the TFTA would not have difficulties in applying it as it would originate from the TFTA and 
would assist in regulating overlapping disputes. A limitation of the efficacy of the TFTA forum 
selection clause would arise where the forum selection clause from the TFTA has to be addressed at 
one of the RECs DSMs. Unlike at the TFTA where the clause would be acceptable, the RECs DSMs 
may be textual and decide to consider the de jure dispute only to the exclusion of the de facto 
dispute. In view of this possible problem the writer submits that there is need for judicial cooperation 
within the African region in order to achieve the trade agenda and integration in general. The writer 
suggests that the RECs have to consider applying comity where they are faced with antecedent and 
parallel disputes. Comity would permit the RECs to decline jurisdiction where they are of the view 
that another court would be more appropriate. In conclusion the RECs are cautioned not to leave the 
application of comity untrammelled which may affect the certainty and predictability. Inextricably 
connected disputes are suggested as a threshold for the application of comity. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Ambitious as they are, the tripartite free trade agreement (TFTA) negotiations have begun and they 
are between member states from the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), 
East African Community (EAC) and Southern African Development Community (SADC).
236
 This 
is an important and progressive initiative for trade in the African region. It is important because it 
could create a wider market for traders in Africa and it is progressive as it could promote intra- 
African trade which could lead to optimum use of the African raw materials. The importance of 
regional integration such as the proposed TFTA cannot be over emphasised especially in view of 
the fact that Africa is characterised by countries with small economies and markets. It is only 
logical to hold a view that integrating these economies and markets may facilitate efficiencies in 
trade and in turn propel development within the African region. 
 
There is no doubt that for this initiative to work and bear the desired results, it has to be well 
designed right from its founding documents. The design of the TFTA is crucial as it may its 
downfall because a poor design may prove difficult if not impossible to implement. The writer 
acknowledges that other factor such as political will may play a role in the implementation stage. 
There are various important institutions
237
 in the proposed TFTA but this study focused on the 
judicial organ of the TFTA or its dispute settlement mechanism (DSM) vis a vis the existing DSMs 
from the RECs. This is a vital organ which should be effective and its effectiveness can contribute 
to the success of the TFTA.
238
 
 
It has been established in section 2.7.3 of chapter two of this study that the RECs and the TFTA 
basically deal with the same subject matter and in turn have similar substantive obligations. They 
all seek to address trade issues such as tariff liberalisation, production and infrastructure. They have 
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a common goal of reaching the status of a monetary union at some point in time. Thus, the RECs 
and the TFTA have overlapping mandates and visions.
239
 It has been observed that the RECs DSMs 
and the TFTA DSM would be independent of each other and would not be in any hierarchical form 
as is the norm in domestic legal systems.
240
 The overlap is also apparent in the institutions created 
or to be created within these agreements, particularly the institutions dealing with dispute 
settlement. There is possible significant jurisdictional overlap between the RECs DSMs and the 
TFTA DSM.
241
  Jurisdictional overlap is discussed in this study as a situation where there is double 
breach, which is where a violation of a particular obligation in one agreement is a violation in 
another agreement.
242
 Jurisdictional overlap or parallel jurisdiction makes it possible for two courts 
to hear the same dispute. 
 
It has been observed in this study that such jurisdictional overlap may create the luxury of forum 
shopping.
243
 Two main implications associated with forum shopping were identified. The first one 
being parallel proceedings, where the same dispute is simultaneously initiated in two or more 
courts. The second one is re-litigation where a dispute that has been settled in one court is re-
opened or re-litigated in another court. These problems can be costly to member states in terms of 
finances and they can jeopardise the African trade law system as a whole because of inconsistent 
rulings that may be reached in the various courts.
244
 
 
Borrowing from the experiences between the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
dispute settlement mechanism and the World Trade Organisation (WTO) dispute settlement 
mechanism, a recommendation that has been put forward for the TFTA is the inclusion of an 
exclusive forum selection clause.
245
 The TFTA should permit its member states to choose a DSM 
which could settle a particular dispute but once chosen that DSM should be exclusive. This 
approach acknowledges jurisdictional overlap and attempts to regulate it. This regulation may assist 
                                                          
239
 See section 2.7.3 of chapter 2. 
240 See section 2.7.3 of chapter 2. 
241
 See section 2.7.3 of chapter 2. 
242 See section 2.7.3 of chapter 2. 
243
 See section 3.1 of chapter 3. 
244
 See section 3.7 of chapter 3. 
245
 See section 4.5.1 of chapter 4. 
 
 
 
 
75 
 
 
will definitely be an effective tool for resolving issues of jurisdictional overlap at the TFTA DSM. 
It is observed in section 4.5.1 of chapter four that the recommended forum selection clause may 
only be effective in so far as its application at the TFTA DSM. This means that it may not be 
recognised at the RECs DSM such that it would not be applicable at that level. Confronted with this 
impediment, it is recommended that there should be judicial cooperation between the TFTA and the 
RECs.
246
 Such cooperation should be the recognition and application of comity in cases where there 
is jurisdictional overlap. The RECs DSMs should not operate as self contained a regimes but 
instead work harmoniously with the TFTA because the ultimate goal is the same, which is an alive 
to the fact that the TFTA may be a competent adjudicatory body for particular disputes. Judicial 
cooperation would allow the RECs DSMS to decline jurisdiction where they determine that the 
dispute brought before as a REC DSM is inextricably connected to the one that is or was before the 
TFTA DSM and that the TFTA DSM is the competent judicial body to settle the whole matter.
247
 
This approach would assist in avoiding re-litigation and unnecessary segmentation of cases. 
 
Jurisdictional overlap between the TFTA DSM and the RECs DSM will have to be addressed at 
some point in time during the interactions of the two layers of regimes. Developing a form of 
regulatory tool such as an exclusive forum selection clause at the TFTA level is progressive and 
will go a long way in assisting the TFTA DSM to resolve issues of jurisdictional overlap between it 
and the RECs DSMs. Judicial cooperation will also ensure that the RECs DSM are on board in 
terms of resolution of cases where there is jurisdictional overlap. Instead of having a segmented 
trade law system, the two recommended solutions would propel the formation of a unified regional 
trade law system. It is without a doubt that they would play an important role in regional 
integration. 
 
 
 
26,503 words 
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